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COMMENTS 
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an 
Alternative View of Adjudication 
Adjudication is interpretation: i t  is the process by which a 
judge comes to understand a legal text and express its meaning.' 
Two opposing views of adjudication prevail in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. The first sees judicial interpretation as being ob- 
jectively constrained by legal rules and institutional principles 
that compel a correct determination of textual meaning.2 The 
second sees judicial interpretation as being subjectively deter- 
mined by personal value preferences that render textual mean- 
ing contingent and rn~ l t ip le .~  
In a crucial way, these two opposing views of adjudication 
are mirror images. Both views assume that interpretation is an 
essentially free and discretionary activity; their disagreement 
turns on whether freedom and discretion can be effectively con- 
strained. While the first view insists that effective constraints 
are available, the second view maintains that they are not. As a 
result, both views focus their discussions largely on the availabil- 
ity of interpretive constraints. In the process, however, their dis- 
1. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.REv. 739 (1982). See generally 
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 T E X .  L. REV. 527 (1982). In this comment, "text" 
connotes any written document, including reported judicial decisions, statutory and con- 
stitutional law, administrative regulations, and such writings as wills and contracts. In 
each instance, the writing is an object o f  interpretation. However, "text" does not con- 
note only written documents. For example, Paul Ricoeur has argued that meaningful 
social action shares the constitutive features o f  a written text, and that the methodology 
o f  the social sciences is similar t o  the procedures for the interpretation o f  written texts. 
P. RICOEUR, The Model o f  the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,  in HER- 
M E N E U T I C S  A N D  T H E  HUMAN SCIENCES 197-221 (1982). In other words, the interpretation 
o f  "text" includes the interpretation o f  social actions and relationships. See C. GEERTZ, 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30, 452 (1973) (culture is an "acted document," an 
"ensemble o f  texts," whose analysis is similar t o  reading a manuscript); see also Taylor, 
Understanding i n  Human Science, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 25 (1980); Taylor, Interpreta- 
tion and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971). 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 6-46. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 47-98. 
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cussions fail to examine the validity of the assumption that in- 
terpretation is free and discretionary. For this reason, Anglo- 
American jurisprudence remains irresolvably divided in its views 
of adjudication. 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the view of interpreta- 
tion that is assumed, but never directly examined, in Anglo- 
American juri~prudence.~ Philosophical hermeneutics contends 
that interpretation is not a free and discretionary activity but 
rather a dialogical interaction between interpreter and text that 
is made possible through their mutual participation in a com- 
mon medium of history and language. In other words, neither 
interpreter nor text independently determines textual meaning; 
both interpreter and text interdependently contribute to the de- 
termination of textual meaning. Thus, contrary to the Anglo- 
4. Philosophical hermeneutics was first elaborated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. See H. 
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). It  is a general theory of interpretation that was 
developed as a challenge to interpretive assumptions in social science and literary theory, 
which are similar to the assumption underlying the opposing views of adjudication in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Philosophical hermeneutics is commanding increased at- 
tention as a powerful critique of traditional interpretive theories in these disciplines. 
See, e.g., Z. BAUMAN, HERMENEUTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (1978); J. BLEICHER, THE HER- 
MENEUTIC   MAC IN AT ION: OUTLINE OF A POSITIVE CRITIQUE OF ~CIENTISM AND SOCIOLOGY 
(1982); J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSO- 
PHY AND CRITIQUE (1980); H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1976); R. HOWARD, 
THREE FACES OF HERMENEUTICS (1982); D. HOY, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HIS- 
TORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1978); R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS: INTERPRETA- 
TION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMACHER. DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER, AND GADAMER (1969); P. RICOUER, 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1981). 
Recently, philosophical hermeneutics has gained some attention in Anglo-American 
jurisprudential literature. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Un- 
derstanding, 60 BU.L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 
Term-Forward: Names and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 , 6  n.11 (1983); Fiss, Objectiu- 
ity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739,745 n.12 (1982); Hermann, Phenomenology, 
Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Conti- 
nental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 398-409 (1982); Leedes, 
An Acceptable Meaning of the Constitution, 61 WASH. U.L. Q. 1003 (1984); McIntosh, 
Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L REV. 1 (1982). By contrast, 
philosophical hermeneutics is the focus of tremendous jurisprudential discussion in Eu- 
rope, particularly in West Germany. See, e.g., J. ESSER, VORVERSTXNDNIS UND 
METHODENWAHL IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (1972); W. HASSEMER, EINF~HRUNG I  DIE GRUN- 
DLAGEN DES STRAFRECHTS 77-80, 113-159 (1981); W. HASSEMER, TATBESTAND UND TYPUS: 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR STRAFRECHTLICHEN HERMENEUTIK (1968); J. HRUSCHKA, DIE KON- 
STITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES (1965); A. KAUFMANN, ANALOGIE UND "NATUR DER SACHE" 
(1965); A. KAUFMANN & W. HASSEMER, EINFUHRUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHT- 
STHEORIE DER GEGENWART (1981); M. KRIELE, THEORIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG (1976); F. 
MULLER, JURISTISCHE METHODIK (1976); H. SCH~NEMANN, SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN UND 
JURISPRUDENZ: EINE EINF~HRUNG FUR PRAKTIKER 47-53 (1976). 
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American jurisprudential view, interpretation is a structured 
process of existential constraints. 
Philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical 
challenge to Anglo-American jurisprudence because the herme- 
neutic view of interpretation renders the Anglo-American debate 
on the availability of constraints for judicial interpretation 
groundless. For this reason, philosophical hermeneutics deserves 
attention from the Anglo-American jurisprudential community. 
At least, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may initiate 
the critical examination of the nature of interpretation that has 
heretofore been ignored. At most, attention to philosophical her- 
meneutics may lead to a transcendence of the opposing views of 
adjudication that prevail in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Part I of this comment contends that Anglo-American juris- 
prudence is riven by opposing views of adjudication and that 
this opposition is based on a common assumption about the na- 
ture of interpretation. Part I1 maintains that this opposi- 
tion-the difference of views concerning the availability of inter- 
pretive constraints-has captured the attention of Anglo- 
American jurisprudence and diverted its focus from examining 
the validity of the assumption about interpretation upon which 
the opposition rests. Next, it examines the nature of interpreta- 
tion from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Part I11 
concludes that the theory of interpretation provided by philo- 
sophical hermeneutics represents a direct challenge to the An- 
glo-American assumption about interpretation and that this 
challenge demands an Anglo-American jurisprudential response. 
The two opposing views of adjudication found in Anglo- 
American jurisprudence may be characterized as objective and 
subjective interpretivism. Objective interpretivism represents an 
effort to interpret a legal text without the influence of the judi- 
cial interpreter's value-orientation, through the construction of 
interpretive constraints. Subjective interpretivism represents a 
countereffort to deconstruct interpretive constraints in the belief 
that interpretation is unavoidably controlled by personal value 
 preference^.^ Both views presume that interpretation is a free 
5. The existence of an objective-subjective opposition has been recognized in legal 
scholarship, Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981), 
326 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
and discretionary activity-free in the sense that the evaluation 
of the text is normatively standardless, and discretionary in the 
sense that judgment of the text entails a personal choice based 
on privately held values. The difference between objective and 
subjective interpretivism lies in their disagreement about the ef- 
ficacy of constraints for interpretive activity. 
A. Objective Interpretivisrn: T h e  Construction of 
Constraints 
The basic justification for the effort of objective interpretiv- 
ism to secure value-free interpretation of a legal text is founded 
on a fundamental tenet of the Anglo-American administration of 
justice: rule of law demands that judicial interpretation occur on 
in theories of literary and legal interpretation, Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Inter- 
pretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Fiss, supra note 1, a t  739, 
in theories of judicial reasoning, Gross, The Theory of Judicial Reasoning-Toward a 
Reconstruction, 66 KY. L.J. 801 (1978); Reynolds, The Concept of Ob~ectiuity in Judicial 
Reasoning, 14 W. ONT. L. REV. 1 (1975), and in legal history, F. SHUMANN, LEGAL POSITIV- 
ISM 95-119 (1963); Kaufman & Hassemer, Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in Ger- 
man Jurisprudential Thought, 19 TORONTO L.J. 461 (1969). 
Professor Roberto Unger has argued that all Western thought is riven by an antin- 
omy between "universals" (objectivism) and "particulars" (subjectivism) that is manifest 
in the persistently irresolvable antinomies of "theory and fact" in the sciences, "reason 
and desire" in human studies, and "rules and values" in jurisprudence. R. UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 133-38 (1975). In Professor Unger's view, the universals have 
lost touch with the particulars, creating an unbridgeable gulf between them. This gulf 
results because of the perception that universals are the only acceptable objects 
thought: 
The evisceration of particulars consists in treating particulars as fungible ex- 
amples of some abstract quality. To be sure, the particulars as parts are recog- 
nized as more real than the universals as wholes. . . . Nevertheless, as the con- 
creteness of the particulars increases, so does their individuality. Therefore, it 
becomes impossible to  think or to speak about them in general categories; 
hence, given the nature of thought and language, impossible to think or speak 
of them a t  all. That much is implied by the antinomy of theory and fact. 
Id. a t  136. 
Ultimately, the objective-subjective opposition in Western thought may be traceable 
to Cartesian metaphysics. See generally 4 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: 
DESCARTES TO LEIBNIZ 74-146 (1963). Descartes's ontological dichotomization of the 
world into subject (inquirer) and object (subject matter) yielded only two alternative and 
mutually exclusive possibilities for providing an account of the world: subjective valua- 
tion or objective description. In other words, explanation is possible only in terms of the 
subject or the object; their essential separation precludes explanation relying on both 
subject and object. See M. HEIDEGGER. The Question Concerning Technology, in THE 
QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. 
HEIDEGGER. Question]; M. HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. HEIDEG- 
GER, Age]; M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 122-34 (1927). 
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a basis other than in accordance with the will of a judge.e In 
pursuit of this ideal, objective interpretivists seek to ensure 
value-free interpretation in two principal ways. First, they seek 
to minimize the normative gaps of the legal system to preclude 
the invitation to rely on subjective values. Second, they seek to 
maximize the institutional demands on judges to adjudicate in 
accordance with the general constitutional character of the legal 
system. In other words, the strategy is to contruct constraints on 
the judicial interpreter in order to ensure his personal detach- 
ment from the legal text. 
The hope of achieving personal detachment from the object 
of interpretation is the reason for characterizing this view of ad- 
judication as objective. Essentially, objectivity is a demand that 
the object of interpretation be allowed to reveal its own meaning 
independent of the value-laden interests of the interpreter.' For 
instance, in the social and literary sciences objectivity is sought 
by way of methodologies that proscribe the personal participa- 
tion of the interpreter in his work. These methodologies preest- 
ablish impersonal criteria of evaluation that are characteristic of 
the object of interpretation itself so that the object may reveal 
its intrinsic meaning.8 The assumption is that the interpreter's 
6. See generally F. HAYEK, THE RULE OF LAW (1975); F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF LIBERTY (1960); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-103 (1975). Professor Mark 
Tushnet has argued that legal objectivity cannot be questioned without undermining the 
rule of law and thus the unique function of the judiciary in the American political order. 
See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1206-07; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Intepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Tushnet, Following the Rules]. 
7. A representative definition of objectivity is found in F. CUNNINGHAM. OBJECTIVITY 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1973). An inquiry is objective if and only if: 
[a] it is possible for its descriptions and explanations of a subject-matter to 
reveal the actual nature of that subject-matter, where "actual nature" means 
"the qualities and relations of a subject-matter as they exist independently of 
an inquirer's thoughts and desires regarding them," and [b] it is not possible 
for two inquirers holding rival theories about some subject-matter and having 
complete knowledge of each other's theories. . . both to be justified in adhering 
to their theories. 
Id. a t  4 (footnote omitted). For other discussions of objectivity, see generally W. 
NEWTON-SMITH, HE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE (1981); K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
(rev. ed. 1981). 
8. One example of such a methodology is found in R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF 
HISTORY (1946). Collingwood argued that, in order to interpret the action of historical 
agents, one must take into account the "inside" or "thought-side" of their actions. His 
assumption was that historical events express the thought of their agents. Thus, under- 
standing historical events required ascertainment of the thoughts of their agents, which 
could be accomplished through "reenactment." By reconstructing the circumstances of 
the historical event, the interpreter could project himself back into the position of the 
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value-laden interests in the text, if allowed to factor into his in- 
terpretation of it, obscures the text's meaning. In jurisprudence, 
objectivity is sought in the same way for the same reason. The 
methodology is the deductive application of preexisting legal 
rules and institutional principles through which the legal text 
may be understood in impersonal legal terms, not in terms of 
personal nonlegal values. 
Objective interpretivism found its first modern expression 
in John Austin's construction of a "science of law."9 A basic 
agent, "reenactn or "rethink" the reasons for the agent's actions, understand the thought 
behind the deeds, and discern the meaning of the event. The methodology of reenact- 
ment is objective in the sense that i t  presupposes the historical interpreter's capacity to 
acquaint himself directly with his subject matter (the historical agent) and to derive the 
subject matter's own special meaning (the thought behind the acts). Reenactment is also 
objective in the sense that it requires the negation of the personal and historical perspec- 
tive of the interpreter and demands evaluation of the historical event as the agent him- 
self evaluated it. Because the agent and the interpreter share a common rational human- 
ity, the interpreter is presumably qualified to evaluate the agent he., the "text") on its 
own terms. For a recent exposition and expansion of Collingwood, see R. MARTIN, HIS- 
TORICAL EXPLANATION: RE-ENACTMENT AND PRACTICAL INFERENCE (1977). 
E. D. Hirsch's search for criteria to validate literary interpretations led him to a goal 
of interpretation similar to Collingwood's: ascertainment of authorial intention. E. 
HIRSCH, VALID~TY I N  INTERPRETATION (1967). "The interpreter's primary task is to 
reproduce in himself the author's 'logic,' his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his 
world. Even though the process of verification is highly complex and difficult, the ulti- 
mate verificative principle is very simple-the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking 
subject." Id. a t  242. Professor Hirsch's position has been accepted in other discussions of 
the applicability of literary interpretation to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., McIntosh, 
supra note 4. 
Some judicial interpreters have thought that authorial intention is determinative of 
textual meaning. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290'U.S. 398, 453 
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("The whole aim of construction, as applied to a pro- 
vision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers 
and the people who adopted it."). For an analysis and criticism of this theory of adjudi- 
cation, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
This comment relies upon Hirsch's rival in hermeneutic philosophy, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, to critique the prevailing views of interpretation in legal thought. The reason 
for this reliance is Hirsch's commitment to objectivity and his resultant inability to con- 
tribute to the transcendence of the objective-subjective opposition. For a good introduc- 
tion to the issues of the Hirsch-Gadamer debate, see D. HOY, supra note 4, a t  11-72. 
9. See generally J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 62-136 (1964). 
Admittedly, Austin is not the first in the Anglo-American tradition to advocate objective 
adjudication. Blackstone wrote "what that law is, every subject knows, or may know, if 
he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is permanent, 
fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN- 
TARIES 151. Elsewhere, he wrote: 
The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their de- 
termination or sentence, but the determination and the sentence of the law. I t  
is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law 
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theme of his legal science was the separation of positive law 
from transpositive  consideration^.'^ The purpose of this separa- 
tion was to allow logical analysis of the positive law in order to 
ascertain the essential concepts and structures of the legal order 
reflected in it." Using this legal scheme required one to 
fix in the mind a map of the law, so that all its acquisitions 
made empirically in the course of practice, take their appropri- 
ate places in a well-conceived system; instead of forming a cha- 
otic aggregate of several unconnected and merely arbitrary 
rules. It tends to produce the faculty of perceiving at a glance 
the dependencies of the parts of his system . . . .I2 
With this legal map, Austin believed that, consistent with his 
rational description of law, the dominant method of judicial in- 
and fact . . . which judgment or conclusion depends not therefore on the arbi- 
trary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of 
justice. 
3 id. a t  434. Indeed, the notion of legal objectivity is ultimately attributable to the 
Greeks. Greek mythology portrays the goddess Themis with the sword of justice in her 
right hand and the scales of justice in her left. She is blindfolded, symbolizing impartial- 
ity. The assumption is that justice originates in judgments that are free from the per- 
sonal prejudices of the legal administrator. Judgment is reached only through the 
mechanical balancing of evidence that is sorted onto the dishes of the scale by other 
similarly impartial persons. Reynolds, supra note 5, a t  2. Interestingly, legal objectivity 
is not endemic only to Anglo-American jurisprudence; it is the primary paradigm of ju- 
risprudential and judicial analysis in legal systems following the civil law tradition. See 
generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969). 
10. Throughout his work, Austin pleaded for a strict separation of law as it is and 
law as it ought to be: 
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be 
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed 
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though 
we happen to dislike it . . . . 
J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 184 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954). Austin did not dismiss the influence 
moral opinion had on the development of law, or conversely, the influence the law had on 
moral standards. He believed, however, that the determination of moral norms upon 
which law ought to rest was not within the province of jurisprudence but was a subject of 
the "science of legislation." Id. at  127, 372. The science of jurisprudence concerned itself 
only with the study of laws once they were posited. See generally Hart, Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Rumble, The Legal 
Positivism of John Austin and The Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 
CORNELL . REV. 986 (1981). 
11. According to Austin, every legal order has the same basic constituent parts. Con- 
cepts like duty, right, liberty, injury, punishment, redress, law, sovereignty, and indepen- 
dent political society belong to every legal order because "we cannot imagine coherently 
a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined community), without conceiv- 
ing them as constituent parts of it." J. AUSTIN. supra note 10, a t  367. 
12. 2 J. AUSTIN. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 
1095 (5th ed. R. Campbell 1885). 
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terpretation was syllogistic: legal classification of the facts and 
their subsumption under general rules.13 
Nevertheless, Austin acknowledged the existence of "judici- 
ary law."14 In instances of linguistic ambiguity in legal terms, 
interstices in the body of positive law, and social change render- 
ing law archaic, judges are invited to legislate rules on the basis 
of their own value-orientations.15 This reality introduced consid- 
erable dissymmetry into Austin's rational system of law.16 His 
response was to conceive of an institutional mechanism that har- 
monized particular judge-made rules with the general legal or- 
der. Reasoning that judicial activity is an extension of the sover- 
eign's power, Austin concluded that the sovereign could 
legitimate judge-made rules either by express acceptance or by 
acquiescence to their existence." In other words, judges could be 
institutionally constrained from arbitrarily legislating rules to 
the extent that they "legislat[e] in subordination to the 
s~vereign."'~ 
Austin's construction of a normatively complete system of 
law and an institutional constraint on judicial interpretation was 
prototypical for subsequent jurisprudential efforts to achieve le- 
13. See Rumble, supra note 10, a t  1017-18. 
14. 2 J. AUSTIN. supra note 12, a t  620. See generally Hart, supra note 10, a t  608-10 
& nn.33-35; Rumble, supra note 10, at 1017-21. 
15. Austin saw ambiguous legal terms as "hotbeds of competing analogies. The in- 
definiteness is incorrigible. A discretion is left to the judge. Questions arising on them. . . 
are hardly questions of interpretation or induction, for though the rule were explored 
and known as far as possible, doubt would remain." 2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  1001 
n.20. Austin also contended that judicial legislation was necessary "to make up for the 
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator." J. AUSTIN, supra note 10, at 191. 
In this regard, judicial legislation was of "obvious utility" to adapt law to social change. 2 
J. AUSTIN. supra note 12, a t  612. Austin noted that equity courts were created because of 
the unwillingness of common law courts to "do what they ought to have done, namely to 
model their rules of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of 
stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages." Id. a t  647. 
16. Austin wrote: 
Wherever, therefore, much of the law consists of judiciary law, the entire 
legal system, or the entire corpus juris, is necessarily a monstrous chaos: partly 
consisting of judiciary law, introduced bit by bit, and imbedded in a measure- 
less heap of particular judicial decisions, and partly of legislative law stuck by 
patches on the judiciary law, and imbedded in a measureless heap of occasional 
and supplemental statutes. 
2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  660. 
17. "For, since the state may reverse the rules which [the judge] makes, and yet 
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will 
'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its 
express declaration." J. AUSTIN, supra note 10, a t  31-32. 
18. 2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  510. 
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gal objectivity. Thus, nineteenth century legal formalism pro- 
pounded the view that a legal system is a closed logical system 
in which correct decisions are deducible from predetermined le- 
gal rules by pure logical operation.'' This formalist view of law 
gained widespread acceptance in legal scholarship and judicial 
opinions.'O Although strict legal formalism has been largely 
abandoned, its substance persists in many contemporary theo- 
ries of judicial decision.'l This is especially apparent among the 
"new analytical j~rists," '~ who seek to document the theoretic 
 fetter^,"'^ or the preexisting principles of rational decision, that 
constrain judicial interpretation. 
One of the leading figures in the new analytical movement 
has been H. L. A. Hart. His strategy was to minimize the fre- 
quency of the linguistic indeterminacy of rules that invites reli- 
ance on subjective values. In his estimation, a legal rule has a 
"core of certainty" and a "penumbra of In the core of 
19. See generally Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 
(1975). Typically, the following five postulates accompany the legal formalist's position: 
[Flirst, that every concrete legal decision [is] the "application" of an abstract 
legal proposition to  a "fact situation"; second, that i t  must be possible in every 
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal prepositions by means 
of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a 
"gapless" system of legal propositions, or must, a t  least, be treated as if it were 
such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" legally in 
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of 
human beings must always be visualized as either an "application" or "execu- 
tion" of legal propositions, or as an "infringement" thereof. 
M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY A~~ SOCIETY 64 (1954) (footnote omitted). 
20. See infra notes 47-49. 
21. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973). Strict legal formal- 
ism is the deductive application of preexisting rules. Substituting "rational" and "princi- 
ples" for "deductive" and "rules" produces a broader definition of formalism: the ra- 
tional application of preexisting principles. In this definition, "principles" may mean 
rules as well as propositions of purpose or value. Professor Kennedy argues that purpose- 
based reasoning is "no less dependent on rules" and "no less vulnerable to the dilemma 
of formality" than is traditional rule formalism. Id. a t  396-98; see also Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Kennedy, Form and Substance]. For example, under Kennedy's analysis, Hart 
and Sack's portrayal of judicial decision as "rational implications of the 'shared pur- 
poses'" implicit in the "social order" ultimately possesses the same structure as rule 
formalism. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 668-69 (Cambridge tent. ed. 1958). 
22. See generally Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861 
(1966). 
23. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the 
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). 
24. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1961); see also Hart, supra note 10, a t  607. 
The problem of penumbral vagueness is inevitable: "the price to be paid for the use of 
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact." H. 
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certainty, the applicability of the rule to a factual circumstance 
is clear. However, in the "fringe of vagueness," the normative 
guidance of the rule dissipates, thus imposing a "creative func- 
tion" upon the judge to resolve the While syllogistic 
reasoning may be appropriate in the core of certainty, it cannot 
be employed in the fringe of vagueness, and resort to subjective 
values is i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  
HART, supra. at  125. Because of the finitude of language, language cannot be successfully 
employed for the subsumption of the infinity of unique constellations of facts available 
in the world. Id. Basically, Hart agrees with the Austrian legal sociologist Karl Wurzel, 
who compared concepts in legal rules to photographs with vague and gradually vanishing 
outlines. "Every concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and beside it a 
zone of transition gradually vanishing into nothingness." K.'WURZEL. METHODS OF JURID- 
ICAL THINKING IN SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 372 (1917). But Hart's more direct philo- 
sophical indebtedness for the penumbral vagueness, or "open texture of law," idea is to 
Waissman's address on verifiability in Supp. vol. 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 119 
(1945). See generally N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 12-19 (1981). 
25. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120, 144 (1961). 
26. Id. at 122-25. The problem is that linguistic indeterminacy allows multiple 
meanings, presenting a judge with "a fresh choice between open alternatives" that can- 
not be decided with formal logic but only with his "discretion." Id. Elsewhere Hart 
wrote: 
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their applica- 
tion to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical de- 
duction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished 
as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what 
judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general 
rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if 
legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, 
their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises. 
. . . [I]t seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in 
such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be . . . . 
Hart, supra note 10, at  606-08. Importantly, Hart contended that normative guidance 
was not wholly lacking in penumbral areas. Overarching social policies from which legal 
rules are derived may cover the "penumbra of doubt." 
The point must be not merely that a judicial decision to be rational must be 
made in the light of some conception of what ought to be, but that the aims, 
the social policies and purposes to which judges should appeal if their decisions 
are to be rational, are themselves to be considered as part of the law in some 
suitably wide sense of "law". . . . [Ilnstead of saying that the recurrence of 
penumbral questions shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete, and 
that, when they fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exer- 
cise a creative choice between alternatives, we shall say that the social policies 
which guide the judges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the 
judges are only "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is 
"latent" within it. To call this judicial legislation is to obscure some essential 
continuity between the clear cases of the rule's application and the penumbral 
decisions. 
Id. at  612. To the extent that Hart relies on purpose or value propositions to reach deci- 
sions in the penumbra of doubt, his concept of law remains formalistic. See supra note 
21. 
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However, Hart  argued that "preoccupation with the penum- 
bra" is a mistake-one that  confuses and obstructs the advance 
of juri~prudence.~' 
[T]o soften the distinction [between clear and penumbral 
cases] is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally 
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no cen- 
tral element of actual law to be seen in the core of central 
meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the nature 
of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to re- 
consideration in the light of social poli~y.~" 
On the contrary, the meaning of rules is normally not in doubt; 
rules have a core of "settled" meaning.29 Proper attention to  this 
fact might reveal an  "essential continuity" in clear and unclear 
case a d j u d i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  For this reason, Hart's concept of law is 
heavily rule-oriented, focusing on the normative constraints im- 
posed on a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . ~ ~  
Another of the leading analysts is Ronald Dworkin. Like 
Hart, Dworkin acknowledges the existence of "hard cases" in 
which "no settled rule dictates a decision."32 However, unlike 
Hart, Dworkin contends that  a judge is not free to interpret 
from nonlegal values,33 but  is constrained to  interpret in light of 
the political structure of his community. Hard-case adjudication 
27. Hart, supra note 10, at 614-15. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. a t  614. 
30. Id. a t  612. 
31. "[Tlhe life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of 
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of 
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case." H. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961). 
32. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Dworkin, Hard Cases]. Presumably, "easy" cases would be cases in which rules with 
settled meaning do dictate a decision. Dworkin has argued that rules are applicable in an 
"all-or-nothing fashion," meaning that "[ilf the facts a rule stipulates are given, then 
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, 
in which case it contributes nothing to the decision." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 
U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967). In short, "rules dictate results, come what may." Id. a t  36. 
33. Dworkin interpreted Hart as contending that a judge, who possesses no rules to 
guide his adjudication, exercises "strong discretion," meaning that "he is not bound by 
any standards from the authority of law. . . ." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 14, 35 (1967). However, i t  is questionable whether Hart can be so interpreted. 
See supra note 26; see also Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 
823, 845 (1972) (Hart uses "rule" in a broad sense that includes principles and stan- 
dards); Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574, 596-99 (1975) (by "discre- 
tion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgment in appealing to public 
standards in resolving borderline cases). 
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requires reference to the set of principles that, comprising a 
community's "constitutional morality," are "presupposed by the 
laws and institutions of the community" and are therefore infer- 
able from those laws and  institution^.^^ By referring to these 
principles, a judge is capable of adjudicating a hard case in a 
fashion that preserves the institutional integrity of the political 
community and achieves the result to which a party is entitled.36 
In short, the legal system is "a seamless web" that provides suf- 
ficient normative guidance for the correct judicial resolution of 
every legal dispute.36 
34. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  1105-07. 
35. Dworkin's argument, which he entitles "the rights thesis," is that judicial deci- 
sions in hard cases are characteristically generated by principle not policy. Id. at  1060. 
Arguments of principle justify a decision by showing that it respects or secures some 
individual or group right; they are distinguishable from arguments of policy that justify a 
decision by showing that i t  advances br  protects some collective goal of the community 
as a whole. Id. a t  1059. Dworkin believes that principles are discoverable from the insti- 
tutional structures that are constitutive and regulative of the context in which the judi- 
cial decision must be made. In the case of a game, for example, the adjudication of a 
hard case by a referee is institutionally constrained to that particular decision which 
preserves the integrity of the game. Id. a t  1078-82. "We do not think that he is free to 
legislate interstitially within the 'open texture' of imprecise rules. If one interpretation of 
[a] rule will protect the character of the game, and another will not, then the partici- 
pants have a right to the first interpretation." Id. a t  1080 (footnote omitted). The 
uniquely correct interpretation of the rule is found when the referee reconstructs the 
game's character by posing to himself different theories about the nature of the game. 
(In this respect, Dworkin's interpretation theory is notably similar to  Collingwood's "re- 
enactment" theory. See supra note 8.) When the referee determines which of the theo- 
ries most appropriately fits the institutional features of the game, then that theory of the 
game's character guides his resolution of the dispute. Consequently, only one party has 
the right to win the dispute, which right is the referee's obligation to determine in light 
of the genuine institutional character of the game. The same applies to a judge who must 
enforce "existing political rights" latent in the combination of the constitutional values 
and substantive rules of his political community. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  
1063. For a good discussion and critique of this argument, see Note, Dworkin's "Right 
Thesis," 74 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (1976); see also Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation 
of a Judge: The HartlDworkin Dispute, 75 MICH L. REV. 473 (1977); Greenawalt, Policy, 
Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977). 
Rolf Sartorius has expressed views that are consistent with Dworkin's. Sartorius ar- 
gues that while on occasion "extra-legal" considerations such as policy or value enter 
judicial reasoning, "legal principles" are always available to govern their use and, accord- 
ingly, "the judge is in all cases ultimately guided by legal principles which severely limit, 
if they do not totally eliminate, his discretion." Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial 
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151 (1971). Moreover, he maintains that "a litigant before a 
court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but 
rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something 
to which the law entitles him." Id. a t  153; see also Sartorius, The Justification of the 
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171 (1968). 
36. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  1093-96; see also Dworkin, Judicial Dis- 
cretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624, 634 n.7 (1963) ("an arrangement of entitlements"); Note, supra 
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In a recent clarification of his position, Dworkin analogizes 
hard-case adjudication to a "chain novel" enterpri~e.~' The task 
of a writer to contribute one chapter to a novel-in-progress re- 
quires him to determine the direction of developments in prior 
chapters. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for 
the entire work, the writer must advance these developments in 
the same direction through his chapter.38 Similarly, the task of a 
judge to adjudicate a hard case in the common law enterprise 
requires him to determine the structure of his legal commu- 
nity-from its profound constitutional arrangement to the de- 
tails of its statutory schemes and judicial opinions. Then, consis- 
tent with the demands of coherency for his work, the judge must 
write his decision " 'going on as before' rather than by starting 
in a new direction as if writing on a clean slate."3s Indeed, the 
note 35, a t  1169-70 (concluding that Dworkin's concept of law is "gapless"). T o  the ex- 
tent that Dworkin asserts overarching legal principles from which legal conclusions can 
be deduced, his jurisprudence may be considered formalist in substance. See supra notes 
19, 21.  
37. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U .  FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). The "chain 
novel" enterprise is described as follows: 
Imagine, then, that  a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project. 
They draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest number writes the 
opening chapter of a novel, which he then sends to  the next number who is 
given the following assignment. He must add a chapter to that novel, which he 
must write so as to make the novel being constructed the best novel i t  can be. 
When he completes his chapter, he then sends the two chapters to the next 
novelist, who has the same assignment, and so forth. 
Id. a t  166-67. 
38. Dworkin wrote: 
Now every novelist but the first has the responsibility of interpreting what has 
gone before . . . . Each novelist must decide what the characters are "really" 
like; what motives in fact guide them; what the point or theme of the develop- 
ing novel is; how far some literary device or figure consciously or unconsciously 
used can be said to contribute to these, and therefore should be extended, re- 
fined, trimmed or dropped. He must decide all this in order to send the novel 
further in one direction rather than another. But all these decisions must be 
made, in accordance with the directions given, by asking which decisions make 
the continuing novel better as a novel. 
Id. a t  167. For a more thorough examination of the chain-novel enterprise and its conse- 
quences for aesthetic and legal interpretation, see Dworkin, supra note 1. 
39. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t  168. 
Deciding hard cases a t  law is rather like this strange literary exercise. The sim- 
ilarity is most evident when judges consider and decide "common-law" cases; 
that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument 
turns on which rules or principles of law "underlie" the related decisions of 
other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or 
she must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply 
to  discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said 
it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in 
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judge is duty-bound by his participation in the common law en- 
terprise to follow the legal history he findq40 thus, "the con- 
straint, that [he] must continue the past and not invent a better 
past, will often have the consequence that [he] cannot reach de- 
cisions that he would otherwise, given his own political theory, 
want to reach."4' 
The construction of constraints on judicial interpretation 
has also proceeded outside the analytic movement. This is exem- 
plified in Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles" and John Hart 
Ely's "textual determinism" approaches. Herbert Wechsler's 
neutral principles approach requires judges to decide cases on 
the basis of general principles that the judges are committed to 
apply consistently in all similar cases.42 John Hart Ely's textual 
the wav that each of our novelists formed an ooinion about the collective novel 
so far written. . . . Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case 
before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumer- 
able decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his 
job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day. 
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to ad- 
vance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of 
his own. So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the ear- 
lier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as 
a whole, really is. 
Dworkin, supra note 1, a t  542-43. 
40. "A judge's duty is t o  interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better 
history." Dworkin, supra note 1, a t  544. 
41. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t  169. Dworkin's chain-novel analogy is a valiant at- 
tempt to outflank both objective and subjective interpretivism. Chain novel interpreta- 
tion is neither purely objective, since i t  allows room for reinterpretation of the prior 
writings in a way that both unifies and provides new meaning, nor purely subjective, 
since i t  prevents the interpreter from proceeding independently of prior institutional 
writers. In this regard, the chain-novel analogy has much to commend it. Nevertheless, 
as Professor Stanley Fish has perceptively and correctly argued, "Dworkin repeatedly 
falls away from his own best insights into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity 
and pure subjectivity) he so forcefully challenges." Fish, supra note 5, a t  552. Dworkin 
"posits for the first novelist a freedom that is equivalent t o  the freedom assumed by 
those who believe that  judges (and other interpreters) are bound only by their personal 
preferences and desires . . . ." Id. a t  555. Moreover, he views later novelists as "bound by 
a previous history in a way that would be possible only if the shape and significance of 
that history were self-evident." Id. 
42. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
11-12, 15 (1959). 
[Tlhe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genu- 
inely principled, resting with respect t o  every step that is involved in reaching 
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that 
is achieved[,] . . . [resting] on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, 
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles 
imply[.] 
H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21 (1961); see also Bork, 
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determinism requires judges to look only to the words of the 
document and, when faced with opaque terms, to the intent of 
those who wrote it. In Ely's view, judges "should confine them- 
selves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in 
the written Constitution . . . ."43 In essence, both of these theo- 
ries assert that the proper institutional role of judicial interpret- 
ers is to follow the available norms in good faith and to commit 
to the logical implications of their appli~ation.~' 
The common element in each of the legal theories 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,6-7 (1971) (ad- 
vocating a requirement that decisions rest on principles that are neutral in content and 
application); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amend- 
ment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 (1980) 
(arguing that the ruling in Harris v. McRae was inconsistent with the operative principle 
of Roe v. Wade and criticizing the Court for not being principled). 
In his criticism of Wechsler, Professor Martin Shapiro observed an essential objec- 
tivism in the "neutral principles" approach: 
[Nleutral principles or standards are really the objective and eternal rules em- 
bedded in a "Blackstonian" body of law and the Constitution, which the judge 
discovers and applies to the case before him. When the defenders of neutral 
principles speak of the judge as motivated by reason, not will, they visualize 
the common law judge who did not command (make law) but simply discov- 
ered by deductive and analogical reasoning which of the great verities of the 
common law controlled the particular set of facts before him. Since the com- 
mon law itself was the embodiment of reason and was applied by a purely 
reasonable process, there was no need of, nor could there be any room for, 
judicial prejudice, fiat, or preference. 
Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral 
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 593 (1963) (footnote omitted). 
43. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1, 3, 13-17 (1980). Professor Ely felt secure in 
asserting that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided because he found it obvious that the 
purported right there vindicated was based on no "value inferable from the Constitu- 
tion" and "lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special." Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933, 949 (1973). 
Professor Ely's understanding of interpretation resembles Professor Thomas Grey's. See 
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu- 
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have a n  Unwritten Consti- 
tution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
The term "textual determinism" is adopted from Professor Owen Fiss who appropri- 
ately found the term that  usually attaches to  Ely's work, "interpretivism," to be misde- 
scriptive. Fiss, supra note 1, a t  743. As will be shown in part I1 of this comment, inter- 
pretation is in fact much more than that contemplated in Professor Ely's approach. 
Professor Ely's "textual determinism" facially resembles Professor George Christie's 
objectivism. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311 (1969). Concluding that 
contemporary legal theorists had failed to "confirm our intuition that judicial decision- 
making is objective," Professor Christie argued that only "those marks on paper called 
statutes and cases" could be accepted as the fixed reference points for judicial interpre- 
tation. Id. a t  1326. 
44. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 6 (arguing that Ely's and Wechs- 
ler's theories are inconsistent with liberalism). 
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presented-Austin's legal science, Hart's minimization of pen- 
umbral doubt, Dworkin's hard case argument, Wechsler's neu- 
tral principles, and Ely's textual determinism-is the effort to 
ensure that the legal text is interpreted without the influence of 
the judicial interpreter's value-orientation. In each case, norma- 
tive gaps in the body of law are minimized, and institutional de- 
mands on the judicial interpreter are maximized, with the design 
of ensuring that the legal text is interpreted in harmony with 
the external legal order. However, this common effort makes 
sense only if the judicial interpreter is viewed as being free to 
determine the outcome of his interpretation in accordance with 
personal value preferences. In other words, by constructing in- 
terpretive constraints, each theory presumes that interpretation 
is an activity in need of constraint because i t  is fundamentally 
free and discretionary. 
This presumption is evidenced in Dworkin's chain novel 
analogy. Dworkin maintains that the contributor of a chapter to 
the novel-in-progress must be seriously committed to continue 
the work of his  predecessor^;^^ indeed, he must be duty-bound to 
"advance the enterprise in hand."46 In other words, an aware- 
ness on the part of the novelist and the judge of their responsi- 
bility to the corporate enterprise will supposedly check a temp- 
tation to strike out in some direction of their own. Only with a 
sense of duty to the enterprise will the novelist and the judge 
comport themselves as partners in the chain rather than as free 
and independent agents. In short, the entire account depends on 
the possibility of novelists and judges (both interpreters) com- 
porting themselves in some fashion that is inconsistent with the 
chain enterprise; i.e., in a free and discretionary fashion. The 
question then becomes whether novelists and judges can com- 
port themselves in a fashion inconsistent with the chain enter- 
prise. If one assumes that the answer is yes, then one must see 
that interpretation as free. If one assumes that the answer is no, 
then one must see interpretation as something entirely different. 
As will be argued in parts 11 and I11 of this comment, interpreta- 
tion is something different from that presumed by objective 
interpretivists. 
45. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 167 ("[IJn this case the novelists are expected to take 
their responsibilities seriously, and to recognize the duty to create, so far as they can, a 
single unified novel rather than, for example, a series of independent short stories with 
characters bearing the same names."). 
46. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 543. 
3231 PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 339 
B. Subjective Interpretiuism: The Uncontrollable Assertion 
of Values 
Objective interpretivism has not gone without critical re- 
sponse. In the early part of the twentieth century, a growing ten- 
dency towards objective formalism in legal ed~cat ion ,~ '  legal 
s c h o l a r ~ h i p , ~ ~  and judicial opinions49 sparked the vigorous 
countermovement of legal realism.60 Legal realism had many dis- 
47. In legal education, Christopher C. Langdell's case-method approach to the study 
of law was gaining widespread acceptance in the law schools. Professor Rumble has sug- 
gested that this was the "signal event" in the emergence of legal realism. Rumble, supra 
note 10, a t  996. 
Langdell's case method presumed that the law consisted of certain principles and 
rules that could be distilled out of selected cases because legal doctrines evolved slowly 
and traceably in relatively few key cases. He argued that the number of legal principles 
and rules is "much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in'which 
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which 
legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension." 
C. LANGDELL. A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed. 1879). 
Consequently, "[tlhe vast majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any 
purpose of systematic study." Id. a t  viii. In order to find the rules of law, a jurist need 
only analyze the key cases in the evolution of a legal doctrine. Once in possession of 
these rules, the "true lawyer" would apply them "with constant facility and certainty to 
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." Id. 
48. In legal scholarship, the American Law Institute undertook its first attempt to 
restate the law in order to clarify the fundamental principles behind the "swamp of deci- 
sions." Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 
pt. 2, 48, 52 (1923). The ALI was established because of the growing recognition that the 
law is uncertain. "[TJhe confusion, the uncertainty, [is] growing worse from year to 
year. . . . [Wlhatever authority might be found for one view of the law upon any topic, 
other authorities could be found for a different view . . . . [Tlhe law [is] becoming 
guesswork." Id. a t  48-49. 
Similarly, legal scholars such as Joseph Beale and Samuel Williston asserted that 
the varied issues in their fields, conflicts of law and contracts respectively, were governed 
by unified bodies of legal doctrine. See 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
92-94 (1935) (determination of domicile has certain automatic legal consequences that 
apply regardless of circumstance). See generally S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1920) (deriving the law of contracts from few general principles of universal appli- 
cability). 
49. In federal and state judicial opinions, social legislation was invalidated partly on 
the "logic" of general constitutional concepts such as liberty of contract and substantive 
due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 US.  45 (1905); see also Allaire v. St. 
Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
50. See generally T. BENDITT. LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE (1978); G. GILMORE, THE 
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-98 (1977); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 1-135 
(1968); R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
Langdell's case method approach was criticized for its exclusive focus on the opera- 
tion of rules in judicial decisions. According to William 0. Douglas, such a focus 
grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law. After all, law is neither 
more nor less than a prediction of what a governmental agency or other agency 
of control will do under a given situation. A study of the legal literature exem- 
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sonant voices; however, these voices achieved harmony in the be- 
lief that a legal text has any number of possible meanings, that 
interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and 
that selecting a particular meaning forces the judge to express 
his own values. In short, legal realism contended that interpreta- 
tion is an uncontrollably subjective value-based activity. Legal 
realism is thus the basic expression of subjective interpretivism 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Legal realism originates with distrust of "the theory that 
traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily opera- 
tive factor in producing court  decision^."^' This "rule-skepti- 
plified by judicial opinions supplies part, but only part, of the material neces- 
sary to make such a prediction. The other psychological, political, economic, 
business, social factors necessary to complete that prediction are innumerable. 
The weakness of the old system was that all of these more general and impon- 
derable factors were eliminated from consideration. I t  was for that reason that 
the nonconformists in legal education began to raise disconcerting notes. 
W. DOUGLAS, Education for the Law, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND 
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURI- 
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 278, 280 (1969). 
Williston's scholarship in contracts was criticized, for example, for presupposing the 
unity of the legal universe, a notion impossible to reconcile with the totality of judicial 
decisions. The "legal universe," wrote Walter Wheeler Cook, "is far more complex than 
that visualized by the more orthodox writers of whom Professor Williston is an exam- 
ple." Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 497, 514 (1939). Cook argued that a 
unified body of legal doctrines could be maintained only if one completely ignored some 
judicial decisions or failed to distinguish consistently between actual holdings and dicta. 
According to Cook, Williston's treatise on contracts illustrated both these vices. Id. a t  
499, 514. For a contemporary critique of recently perceived formalizations of law, see 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
387 (1981). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound were vigorous in their condemnation of 
judges who decided cases solely in a formally deductive manner from legal generaliza- 
tions. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 16 (1910); Pound, 
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,457, 478-80 (1909). Holmes, for instance, criticized 
analysis that relied on the logical compulsion of legal generalizations to  reach particular 
conclusions. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 
198 US.  45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes insisted upon the role of uncon- 
scious factors in reaching decisions. "The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition 
more subtle than any articulate major premise." Id. This skepticism towards general 
rules as a means of compelling particular decisions and this insistence on the role of 
unconscious factors in the adjudicatory process found resonance in the realist movement 
as two of its central themes. See W. RUMBLE, supra, a t  39-40. 
51. K. LLEWELLYN. JURISPRUDENCE: R ALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 56 (1962). 
"[Tlhe theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled not only library- 
ridden recluses, but judges. More, to have fooled even those skillful and hard-bitten first- 
hand observers of judicial work: the practitioners." Llewellyn, The Constitution as  a n  
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1934). 
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c i ~ m " ~ ~  was motivated by the interpretive malleability and nor- 
mative ambiguity of legal materials. For example, Karl 
Llewellyn observed two judicial techniques of case construction 
that permit either an extremely narrow or an extremely wide ap- 
plication of p r e ~ e d e n t . ~ ~  With the "strict" or "orthodox" tech- 
nique, a judge can, "through examination of the facts or of the 
procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was actually before 
the court and can hold that the ruling made requires it to be 
understood as thus restricted."" In other words, a judge can, if 
he desires, limit the authoritative value of an "unwelcome prece- 
dent" by so narrowly confining it to its particular facts that its 
ruling could be made to apply only to "red-headed Walpoles in 
pale magenta Buick cars."bb By contrast, the "loose view of pre- 
cedent" holds that once "a court has decided . . . any point or all 
points on which it chose to rest a case," then "[nlo matter how 
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts or 
the procedural issues, if that was the rule the court laid down, 
then that the court has held."" The judge can, if he chooses, 
capitalize on "welcome precedents" for the purpose of authorita- 
tively supporting any proposition he  desire^.^' Essentially, the 
same judicial techniques were thought to be available for statu- 
tory cons t ru~ t ion .~~  
This range of interpretive possibilities for case and statu- 
tory materials decreased their normative value for the realists. 
52. This term appears to have been coined by Jerome Frank. See J .  FRANK. LAW AND 
THE MODERN MIND (1949). Professor Rumble treats this term as being descriptive of the 
main currents of the realist movement. See W. RUMBLE, supra note 50, a t  48-106. But for 
an  argument distinguishing influential realist Karl Llewellyn's work from "rule-skepti- 
cism," see W. TWINING. KARL LLEWELLYN A D THE REALIST MOVEMENT 408 n.22 (1973). In 
any event, rule-skepticism for the realists did not mean that judges completely disre- 
garded rules in adjudication but only that rules were one factor among many, including 
social, moral and psychological factors, which influenced judicial decisions. W. RUMBLE, 
supra note 50, a t  189-90. 
53. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66-68 (1960). In an earlier book, Llewellyn 
explicated 64 techniques of precedential construction. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 77-91 (1960) [hereinafter cited as K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION]. 
54. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66 (1960). 
55. Id. a t  67. 
56. Id. a t  67-68. 
57. Id. a t  68. 
58. "[Algain and again . . . I have had to insist that the range of techniques correctly 
available in dealing with statutes is roughly equivalent to the range correctly available in 
dealing with case law materials." K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  371. Llew- 
ellyn listed 47 examples of contradictory, yet legally acceptable, canons of statutory con- 
struction, id. a t  522-35, to illustrate that "there are two opposing canons on almost every 
point." Id. a t  521. 
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But the realists maintained that such normative ambiguity was 
inconsequential in comparison to the equivocity resulting from 
the plethora of squarely conflicting judicial decisions. For exam- 
ple, Benjamin Cardozo believed that every legal precedent could 
be matched by another reaching an opposite conclusion.5s Con- 
sequently, a judge could find precedential authority for any pro- 
position on nearly any issue.'O 
The absence of consistent normative guidance from legal 
materials had two important consequences for the realists' pic- 
ture of judicial interpretation. First, the normative void necessi- 
tated judicial choice; it "disposes of all questions of 'control' or 
dictation by pre~edent."~' With conflict among precedential au- 
thorities, a judge was compelled to choose from among them the 
authority that best assisted him in resolving his case. The au- 
thority he chose to rely upon was solely within his control; he 
possessed "sovereign prerogative of ~hoice."'~ As Herman Oli- 
phant pictured the necessity of judicial choice, every case con- 
sidered by judge or student "rests at  the center of a vast and 
empty stadium. The angle and distance from which that case is 
viewed involves the choice of a seat. Which shall be chosen? 
Neither judge nor student can escape the fact that he can and 
60. Belief in the plurality of judicial authority on any issue was virtually universal 
among the realists. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 
(1908) (Justice Holmes portrayed judicial decision as a balancing of opposed principles); 
B. CARDOZO, supra note 59, a t  40 (one principle or precedent often is matched by another 
pointing to an opposite conclusion); J. FRANK, supra note 52, a t  111 n.2 ("You will al- 
most always find plenty of cases to cite in your favor."); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  
339 ("Our whole body of authoritatively accepted ways of dealing with authorities . . . is 
a body which allows the court to select among anywhere from two to ten 'correct' alter- 
natives in something like eight or nine appealed cases out of ten."); Cohen, The 
Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 11 (1937) (cases often pre- 
sent "a plaintiff principle and a defendant principle," each opposing the other); Corbin, 
The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 246 (1914) (prior judicial decisions "are not 
harmonious; in them can be found authority for both sides of almost any question"); 
Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 298 (1929) (broad general 
principles of the law have a significant habit of traveling in pairs of opposites); Douglas, 
Stare Decisis, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 18, 19 
(1963) ("[Tlhere are usually plenty of precedents to go around; and with the accumula- 
tion of decisions, it is no great problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most 
propositions."). 
61. K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  76. 
62. O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
210, 239 (1920), quoted in E. Ros~ow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE xiii (1962). 
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must choose."s3 In sum, judges, not rules, possessed the critical 
function in case adjudication. 
The second consequence of the normative void for the real- 
ists' picture of adjudication was that judicial choice could be 
made and justified only on extralegal grounds. Llewellyn rea- 
soned that if conflicting legal premises are available, then "there 
is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which 
can be justified only as a question of policy-for the authorita- 
tive tradition speaks with a forked t~ngue."'~ In other words, 
without the authority of dispositive rules, judges could only re- 
sort to nonlegal values to resolve disputes. Some realists hoped 
that the extralegal grounds the judge used to justify his decision 
would be considerations of the social consequences of his in- 
tended decision as weighed against possible alternative deci- 
sions. In the balancing of possible social consequences resulting 
from his decision, the judge became, for the realists, a kind of 
social engineer, and the law became his instrument to facilitate 
social progress and j~st ice. '~ 
63. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J .  71, 73 (1928). 
64. K.'LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  70. Felix Cohen made a similar statement: 
"[Nlo one of these rules [of prior cases] has any logical priority; courts and lawyers 
choose among competing propositions on extra-logical grounds." F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYS- 
TEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS. AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 35 n.47 
(1959). 
65. This instrumental aspect of legal realism was the result of the influence of Wil- 
liam James's and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism. See generally W. RUMBLE, 
supra note 50, a t  4-20, 72-78; R. SUMMERS, supra note 50, a t  22-35. The pragmatists were 
antiformalist thinkers. William James stressed that theorists should turn "away from 
abstraction . . . , from verbal solutions, from had a priori reasons, from fixed principles, 
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." W. JAMES, What Pragmatism 
Means, in THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES 376, 379 (J. McDermott ed. 1968). Instead, 
theorists should adopt a "pragmatic" orientation, by "looking away from first things, 
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and . . . looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts." Id. a t  380 (emphasis omitted). This "pragmatic method," or result- 
orientation, was concerned with the "ways in which existing realities may be changed." 
Id. Similarly, John Dewey argued that theoretical decision-making should be result-ori- 
ented. "The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can best be 
done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is t o  find 
statements of general principle and of particular fact which are worthy to serve as prem- 
ises." J. DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION 134 (1931). Thus, the "logic of rigid dem- 
onstration" must be replaced by a "logic of search and discovery," a "logic relative to 
consequences rather than to antecedents," a "logic of inquiry into probable conse- 
quences." Id. a t  138-39; see also J .  DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); J. 
DEWEY, ESSAYS I N  EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC (1916). 
This result-orientation was picked up by the realists. Llewellyn wrote that realistic 
jurisprudence "fits into the pragmatic and instrumental developments in logic." K. 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  28. With society in a constant state of flux, "and in flux 
typically faster than the law, . . . the probability is always given that any portion of law 
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But other realists believed that the justification of the judi- 
cial decision would not be socially instrumental, but subjectively 
intuitive. Psychology teaches, wrote Jerome Frank, that "the 
process of judging" does not begin at  a premise and proceed to a 
conc lu~ion .~~  "Judging begins rather t.he other way around-with 
a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily 
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find prem- 
ises which will substantiate it."67 Frank argued that the same 
must apply to judges. 
Now, since the judge is a human being and since no 
human being in his normal thinking processes arrives a t  deci- 
sions (except in dealing with a limited number of simple situa- 
tions) by the route of . . . syllogistic reasoning, it  is fair to as- 
sume that the judge, merely by putting on the judicial ermine, 
will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial 
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are 
worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formu- 
lated.68 
Frank believed the formulation of the conclusion, whether done 
vaguely, tentatively, or expressly was an expression of the "sub- 
jective sense of justice inherent in the 
Other realists also believed that judicial intuitions about the 
particular justice of a case motivated judges to resolve that case 
in a particular way. Llewellyn wrote that the judicial mind is 
driven by a sense of "Justice-for-All-of-Us."70 Benjamin Cardozo 
argued that a judge's decision in choosing between alternative 
standards is based on the "conviction in the judicial mind7' that 
the standard selected leads to " j~ s t i c e . "~~  Finally, according to 
Judge Frank Hutcheson, judicial decisions are reached by an in- 
needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it  purports to serve." Id. a t  
55. Thus, the realists advocated an examination of law to the end that it might be made 
adaptable to man's own ends. "A good deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of 
attempts to show that [a] definition of law. . . is either true or false," wrote Felix Cohen. 
"A definition of law is useful or useless. I t  is not true or false, any more than a New 
Year's resolution or an insurance policy." F. COHEN. Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 
33, 62 (L. Cohen ed. 1970). 
66. J. FRANK. supra note 52, a t  100. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. a t  101 (citation omitted). 
69. Id. a t  281 (citation and emphasis omitted). 
70. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  339. 
71. B. CARDOZO, supra note 59, a t  41. 
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tuitive "hunch."72 "[Tlhe judge really decides by feeling, and not 
by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination . . . ."73 For 
Judge Hutcheson, "the vital, motivating impulse for the Ijudi- 
cial] decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for 
that cause."74 
For some legal realists, judicial intuitionism was simply in- 
adequate for a theory of adjudi~ation.'~ Having raised profound 
skepticism in the objective formalist model of adjudication, 
some realists felt compelled to provide some hope for legal con- 
sistency and certainty. Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the 
principle of hope: predictionism. 
People want to know under what circumstances and how far 
they will run the risk of coming up against what is so much 
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to 
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our 
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.76 
72. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELL .Q. 274 (1929); cf. Prott, Updating the Judicial "Hunch": 
Esserk Concept of Judicial Predisposition, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 461 (1978) (inaccurately 
comparing a German theorist's legal hermeneutic theory with Hutcheson's "hunch" 
notion). 
73. Hutcheson, supra note 72, a t  285. 
74. Id. John Rawls has written the following in contrasting systematic theories of 
justice with the intuitionist-pluralist perspective: 
Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of 
first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular 
types of cases: and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, 
for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a 
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. 
J .  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971). This is an apt description of the ground of 
legal realism's judicial intuitionism. 
75. This inadequacy was observed from without the ranks of legal realism: 
They have assured us of the immense range of irrational considerations enter- 
ing into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial 
determinations, the dominating influence of prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and 
preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits . . . without present- 
ing us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the 
building of a serviceable science of legal methodology. 
Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 
44 VA. L. REV. 365,376 (1958). One reason for this inadequacy may be that realists were 
intent on destroying, rather than constructing, theory. See Rumble, The Paradox of 
American Legal Realism, 75 ETHICS 166, 173-76 (1965). 
76. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); see also K. LLEWEL- 
LYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 13 (1960) ("[Tjhe main thing is seeing what officials do . . . and 
seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing-a regularity which makes possible 
prediction of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow."). 
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However, realists who were committed to predictionism could 
not agree on those factors from which accurate predictions could 
be made.77 The only agreement was that one had to look beyond 
the "paper" rules, or the formal legal rules enunciated in judicial 
decisions, and discover the "real" rules, or the psychological, po- 
litical, economic, business, and social factors that accounted for 
judicial behavior in a particular case.7s 
77. Fred Rodell argued that one could look a t  the "vast complex of personal fac- 
tors-temperament, background, education, economic status, pre-Court career" and 
make predictions based on these factors "with a surprising degree of accuracy." Rodell, 
For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO. L J  700, 700-01 
(1962). Llewellyn cited 14 "steadying factors" upon which predictions could be based. K. 
LLEWELLYN. TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  19-51. Herman Oliphant argued that the pre- 
dictable element in judicial decisions is the judges' "response to the stimuli of the facts 
of the concrete cases before them . . . . The response of their intuition of experience to 
the stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having the constancy and objec- 
tivity necessary for truly scientific study." Oliphant, supra note 63, a t  159. 
78. In other words the "real" rules of the judicial process are the regularities of 
judicial behavior. The paper-real rule distinction is found in both J. FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 336-37 (1949), and K. LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 51, a t  21-27. 
This emphasis on studying and describing actual judicial behavior led some realists 
to attempt to create a precise science of judicial behavior through empirical research. 
This largely inspired the foundation of the Institute of Law a t  the John Hopkins Univer- 
sity in 1928. The aim of the school was "the development of the scientific study of law. 
All else [was] incidental." Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 309 
(1927). Achievement of this objective required research of an empirical nature. Walter 
Wheeler Cook emphasized that 
the only way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action and not 
to read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to attempt by reasoning to 
deduce it from fundamental principles assumed to be fixed and given. The con- 
sequence of this assumption is that only a small part of the work of the staff of 
the Institute will be with books in libraries; by far the larger part will be con- 
cerned with the difficult, time-consuming, and expensive task of gathering and 
interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system. 
Cook, Scientific Study and the Administration of Justice, 34 MD. ST. B.A. REP. 148 
(1929). 
One interpretation of the realist movement is that i t  was not a critical reaction to 
Langdellian and formalist model of law. See G. GILMORE, supra note 50. Gilmore believes 
that 
the adepts of the new jurisprudence-Legal Realists or whatever they should 
be called-no more proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Langdellian juris- 
prudence than the Protestant reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centu- 
ries proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Christian theology. These were 
the ideas that "law is a science" and that there is such a thing as "the one 
True rule of law." 
Id. a t  87. Gilmore therefore maintains that "[r]ealist jurisprudence proposed a change of 
course, not a change of goal." Id. a t  100. Although this interpretation is defensible, i t  
does not represent the whole movement. Some realists doubted that a science of law was 
possible a t  all. See, e.g., Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 761, 773 (1932); 
Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal "Science," 20 N.C.L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1941). For a good 
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Jerome Frank rejected the search for "real" rules. In 
Frank's estimation, "the major cause of legal uncertainty is fact- 
uncertainty-the unknowability, before the decision, of what the 
trial court will 'find' as the facts, and the unknowability after 
the decision of the way in which it 'found' those facts."79 Thus, 
Frank concluded that "it is impossible, and will always be im- 
possible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which deci- 
sions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) law- 
suits."80 Fact-uncertainty arises for two reasons. First, in 
addition to possessing discretion in rule-applying, a judge pos- 
sesses discretion in fact-finding. "When the oral testimony is in 
conflict as to a pivotal fact-issue, the trial judge is a t  liberty to 
choose to believe one witness rather than an~ther."~'  This dis- 
cretionary fact-finding is "almost boundless" since appellate 
courts rarely interfere with such  determination^.^^ Second, 
judges react to facts very subjectively. These judicial subjectivi- 
ties include "unique, idiosyncratic, sub-threshold biases and 
predilections" which are impossible to precisely define.83 Simi- 
larly, jurors reach their fact-determinations on "emotional re- 
sponses to the lawyers and wi tnes~es ."~~ Because of these una- 
discussion o f  the  branch o f  legal realism concerned with creating a "science o f  law," see 
Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant & Yntema: T h e  Scientific Wing of American Legal Real- 
ism (pts. 1-2), 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 249 (1979); see also Schlegel, American Legal Realism 
and Empirical Social Science: The  Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 195 (1980); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From 
the  Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979). 
79. J. FRANK, supra note 52, at xiv. Frank characterized his argument as "fact-skep- 
ticism." It marks one o f  the  major divisions in t he  realist movement. See generally W.  
RUMBLE, supra note 50, at 107-36. Frank classified the  realists into two groups: rule- 
skeptics and fact-skeptics. Rule-skeptics, o f  whom Llewellyn was "the outstanding repre- 
sentative," focus on appellate courts and strive for greater legal certainty. Fact-skeptics 
focus on trial courts and deny the  possibility o f  accurate formulations o f  real rules. J. 
FRANK, supra note 78, at 73-75. 
80. J. FRANK, supra note 78, at 74 ("the pursuit o f  greatly increased legal certainty 
is, for the  most part, futile-and . . . its pursuit, indeed may well work injustice"). 
81. Id. at 57. 
82. Id. 
83. J. FRANK, supra note 52, at xxvi. "The  reactions o f  trial judges or juries t o  the  
testimony are shot through with subjectivity." J. FRANK, supra note 78, at 22. Elsewhere, 
Frank called these subjectivities "prejudices o f  judges . . . [that] have no 'large scale 
social' character, and lack uniformity. T h e y  are distinctly individual, unconscious, un- 
get-at-able." T h e y  are "concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated . . . secret, 
unconscious, private, idiosyncratic." Frank, "Short of  Sickness and Death": A S tudy  of  
Moral Responsibility i n  Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 573, 582 (1951). 
84. J. FRANK. supra note 78, at 130. Frank continues, "they like or dislike, not any 
legal rule, but  they do  like an artful lawyer for the  plaintiff, t he  poor widow, the  brunette 
with the soulful eyes, and they do  dislike the big corporation, the  Italian with a thick, 
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voidable subjectivities in the judicial process and the 
impossibility of rationalizing them, Frank concluded that "real" 
rules could never be formulated concerning the probable out- 
come of cases.86 
Although the energy of legal realism was largely spent by 
m i d c e n t ~ r y , ~ ~  its legacy remains. The critical legal studies move- 
ment is one example of the contemporary continuation of the 
legal realist attack on objective legal analysis.s7 Critical legal 
scholars agree with the realists' contention that legal analysis is 
nothing more than a veneer covering deeper motives for judicial 
decisions. But critical legal scholars depart from the realists by 
providing a neo-Marxist, materialist explanation, rather than a 
psychoanalytic account of judicial  decision^.^^ They undertake 
this explanation in two principal ways. First, they show legal 
foreign accent." Id. Elsewhere, Frank contended that "adequate fact-finding . . . requires 
devoted attention, skill in analysis, and, above all, high powers of resistance to a multi- 
tude of personal biases. But these qualities are obviously not possessed by juries. They 
are notoriously gullible and impressionable." J. FRANK, supra note 52, a t  192. 
85. Any attempt to increase the capacity of "real" rules to scientifically accurate 
predictions about judicial behavior, Frank believed, was impossible: 
[Slince most persons consider that a true science makes predictions possible, 
we ought to put an end to notions of a "legal science" or a "science of law," 
unless we so define "legal" or "law" as to exclude much of what must be in- 
cluded in the judicial administration of justice, because no formula for predict- 
ing most trial-court decisions can be devised which does not contain hopelessly 
numerous variables that cannot be pinned down or correlated. 
J. FRANK. supra note 78, a t  190 (footnote omitted). 
86. See generally W. RUMBLE. supra note 50, a t  238-39. 
87. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Decon- 
struction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 623-30 (1984) (critical legal studies is a "direct descen- 
dent" of legal realism); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
563, 564-73 (1983) (criticism of the formalist and objectivist traditions underlying mod- 
ern legal thought as a characteristic theme of the movement); White, The Inevitability 
of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649, 649-57 (1984) (critical legal studies' self- 
identification with legal realism is an attempt to achieve legitimacy); Note, 'Round and 
'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669, 1677 (1982) (critical legal scholars have a "particularly close kinship" to 
legal realist forebears, and the work of the former can be understood as a "maturation" 
of the work of the latter). 
For a critical assessment of the critical legal studies movement, see Hutchinson & 
Monahan, Law, Politics, and The Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drnma of 
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want 
to be Radical?, 36 STAN L. REV. 247 (1984); Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through 
Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984); Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94 
ETHICS 126 (1983); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Re- 
view), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1983). 
88. See Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 6 
n.* (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (critical legal scholars borrow heavily from the "Marxist tradi- 
tion and current trends in Marxist thought"). 
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doctrines to be historically contingent by demonstrating their 
change over time in response to judicial class biases and judicial 
perceptions of the material needs of capitalist society.8e Second, 
they show legal reasoning to be fundamentally incoherent by 
elaborating the logical contradictions or "opposing principles" 
underlying private law, particularly the law of the marketplace, 
contract law.80 Thus, they view legal analysis as ideological, non- 
rational argumentatione1 that is used to legitimate existing social 
 practice^.^^ 
89. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Professor Hor- 
witz argues that precapitalist, communitarian doctrines of private law made way for 
nineteenth century capitalist-oriented doctrines because of the class sympathies of 
judges and their historically limited perceptions of social needs. However, this account of 
legal development is disputed. See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History 
of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (demonstrating that no such shift occurred in 
contract law during the period Horwitz describes); White, The Intellectual Origins of 
Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977) (providing a fundamentally different account 
of the development of tort theory). 
For other examples of the critical legal studies argument for the development of 
American law, see Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline 
of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601, 601, 604 (1977) (arguing 
that law is composed of "interpretive activity, arising in concrete social situations" and 
that legal structure encompasses a mode of interpretation "at the level of the implicit 
legal consciousness moving within the whole of social discourse"); Tushnet, Perspectives 
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of 
American Law," 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81 (tracing the development of American law and 
noting the impact on legal structure and social order from societal norms and "autono- 
mous internal dynamics"); see also Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 
(1984). 
90. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 21. Professor Kennedy argues 
that "there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues [found 
in American private law opinions, articles, and treatises] which I call individualism and 
altruism." Id. a t  1685; see also Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Unger, supra note 87. 
91. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). Professor Kelman depicts legal argument as involving "inter- 
pretive construction," or the conscious and unconscious reduction of factual situations to 
substantive legal controversies, and "rational rhetoricism," or "the process of presenting 
the legal conclusions that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the 'facts.' " 
Id. a t  592. In Kelman's view, the necessary imposition of interpretive constructs prior to 
the employment of rational rhetoricism radically undercuts the rationality of legal 
argument: 
[Ilnterpretive constructs. . . are . . . simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators 
of experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to perceive 
or talk,at all. . . . When the unwarranted conceptualist garbage is cleared away, 
dominant legal thought is nothing but some more or less plausible common- 
wisdom banalities, superficialities, and generalities, little more on close analysis 
than a tiresome, repetitive assertion of complacency that "we do pretty well, 
all considered, when you think of all the tough concerns we've got to balance." 
Legal thought does have its rigorous moments, but these are largely grounded 
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Other less organized remnants of legal realism can be found 
in other contemporary writings. In his leading law school primer 
on judicial reasoning,03 E. H. Levi portrays adjudication in terms 
of organic growth in the law whereby the "concepts" that ex- 
press the law change in response to changed conditions in soci- 
ety.04 His model implies that judicial "intuition" is the vehicle 
by which a judge registers and implements into law the changed 
"concepts" of s o ~ i e t y . ~ ~  In contrast, Sanford Levinson, maintain- 
ing that the unavailability of determinate meaning in literary in- 
terpretation applies equally to judicial interpretation, argues 
that every judicial interpreter is radically impaired in his ability 
to confidently express the meaning of the text or to reject the 
meaning proposed by another.96 The "contingency of percep- 
in weak and shifting sands. There is some substance, but we tend to run for 
cover when it appears. 
Id. a t  671-72; see also Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Kairys, supra note 
88, a t  3 ("There is no legal reasoning in the sense of legal methodology or process for 
reaching particular, correct results." Law is "only a wide and conflicting variety of styl- 
ized rationalizations from which courts pick and choose."); Trubek, Complexity and 
Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought 
About Law, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 529, 561 (1977) ("I see the [legal] system as partially 
open and flexible, and therefore as offering support for moral and political 'entrepre- 
neurs' who can take advantage of the pressures of ideals and the legitimation needs of 
the system to effect changes that can further genuine equality, individuality, and 
community."). 
92. See Gabel, supra note 89, a t  602 (traditional legal theory produces fictions by 
hypostatizing phenomena into facts); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 
90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1276 (1981) (traditional legal scholarship contributes to legitimation 
of oppressive social order); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 
BUFFALO L. REV. 209 (1979) (the Commentaries legitimated existing social practices in 
Blackstone's England through the creation of artificial legal categories that gradually 
assumed an appearance of necessity). 
93. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948). 
94. Id. a t  6-9. 
95. In Levi's model of reasoning, "concepts" (such as consideration and trespass), 
not legal rules, are the main vehicles of the law. See Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent 
and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV. 587, 604 (1938). His model follows Max Radin's 
portrayal of judicial reasoning as a selection between "several categories [that] struggle 
. . . for the privilege of framing the situation before [the judges]." Radin, The Theory of 
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,359 (1925). Radin argues that 
" 'principles' are not princip!es at  all but aggregations of type transactions, schematized 
to make them easier to carry in one's memory." Id. a t  360; see also K. LLEWELLYN, TRA- 
DITION, supra note 53 (conceptions such as "type situation" and "situation-sense" are 
basic to judicial reasoning). However, these pictures of judicial reasoning provide no nor- 
mative guidance for weighing the "concepts" or "categories." See J. RAWLS, supra note 
74, a t  34. 
96. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). For a criticism of this 
position, see Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495 (1982). 
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tion" results in "fractured and fragmented d i scour~e , "~~  leaving 
the interpreter with only a mere "hope that some future con- 
junction of author and reader will provide a common language of 
Ijudicial] d iscour~e."~~ 
In sum, legal realism and its heirs basically argue that judi- 
cial interpretation is an unavoidable expression of privately held 
values because of the unavailability of effective interpretive con- 
straints. They see normative guidance as being unavailable be- 
cause it is not self-evident: a variety of meanings is attributable 
to the same precedent or statute and contradictory meanings ex- 
ist among different precedents and statutes. Therefore, judicial 
interpreters are compelled to choose from among the available 
meanings-a choice that can be made only on extralegal bases 
that include the privately held values of the judicial interpreter. 
Similarly, institutional demands that a judicial interpreter per- 
form in a certain fashion are ineffective. The irrepressible sub- 
jective motivations of the judicial interpreter make it impossible 
to ensure the judicial interpretation of a text within any objec- 
tive constraint. 
The Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions of objective 
and subjective interpretivism both presume that judicial inter- 
pretation is a free and discretionary activity. The principal dif- 
ference between these two traditions lies in the extent to which 
they believe that the judicial interpreter can be controlled in ex- 
ercising his freedom and discretion. On one hand, the objective 
interpretivist tradition constructs normative and institutional 
constraints that supposedly prevent the responsible judicial in- 
terpreter from freely resorting to personal, value-laden consider- 
ations. On the other hand, the subjective interpretivist tradition 
denies the authority and efficacy of such constraints, concluding 
that judicial interpretation is an activity motivated by nonratio- 
nal subjective interests. 
Unfortunately, both traditions have failed to examine criti- 
cally their common presumption that interpretation is by nature 
free and discretionary. Rather, each tradition has directed its ef- 
forts a t  contesting the availability of interpretive constraints. 
97. Levinson, supra note 96, at 402-03. 
98. Id. 
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The result has been the incapacity of both jurisprudential tradi- 
tions to transcend their opposition. Thus, while objective inter- 
pretivism's preoccupation with constructing normative and insti- 
tutional constraints has prevented it from investigating the 
possible structure of interpretation, subjective interpretivism's 
primary interest in deconstructing these constraints has diverted 
its attention away from the need to explain the otherwise "mys- 
terious" act of in te rp re ta t i~n .~~  
The objective-subjective opposition can be transcended by 
denying the common presumption about the nature of interpre- 
tation. In other words, if interpretation is shown not to be free 
99. Professor Edgar Bodenheimer once argued that the divergent ideological com- 
mitments of analytical positivism and legal realism prevented them from providing "a 
well-considered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the law." 
Bodenheimer, supra note 75, at  375. Responding to H.L.A. Hart's "open texture" charac- 
terization of legal rules, Bodenheimer maintained that Hart's continuing commitment to 
the analytical positivist ideal of judicial objectivity inhibited him (and would inhibit all 
other analytical positivists) from investigating the possible structure of judicial discre- 
tion. On the other hand, the legal realists' continued assurance to jurists "of the im- 
mense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectiv- 
ity necessarily inherent in judicial determinations, [and] the dominating influence of 
prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits" 
diverted his focus from "presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive ele- 
ments necessary for the building of a serviceable science of legal methodology." Id. a t  
376. In short, the ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism were 
"leading the science of law into a blind alley from which it can extricate itself only by an 
extensive and serious re-investigation of the entire realm of legal methodology." Id. a t  
375; see also R. UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 3, 104-42 (1975) (characterizing con- 
ceptions of reason intrinsic to Western thought in the sciences, humanities, and jurispru- 
dence as dichotomous, which results in a "prison house" for thought from which escape 
is possible only with a "total criticism" of the "deep structures" of our thought and a 
transcendence of the dichotomies with a "holistic consciousness"); Gross, supra note 5 
(outlining jurisprudential "patterns of evasion" of the rule-value dichotomy); Reynolds, 
supra note 5 (following Bodenheimer's analysis). 
Charles A. Miller's description of judicial interpretation is one example of the "blind 
alley" or "prison house" effect flowing from objective-subjective dichotomous views of 
adjudication:. 
The three sources of decision-values, rules, and facts-combine to focus on 
the mysterious "act of deciding." While the sources of decision are rationally 
comprehensible, the act of deciding is not. But after that act, adjudication be- 
comes understandable once more when the opinion of the court, the explana- 
tion of decision, is handed down. 
C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 11 (1969) (footnote omitted). 
This description vacillates helplessly between objective and subjectiJe accounts without 
hope of any synthesis. For this reason, the act of judicial interpretation remains mysteri- 
ous. A similar vacillation is evident within legal realism between its scientific and intui- 
tionist wings. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78. More recently, Professor Dwor- 
kin's position has been characterized as a vacillation between objectivity and 
subjectivity. See Fish, supra note 5. 
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and discretionary, then the disagreement between objective and 
subjective interpretivism over the availability of effective con- 
traints for interpretation disappears. No ground exists to sup- 
port the disagreement. Jurisprudential discussion of adjudica- 
tion is then necessarily transformed to reflect the new view of 
interpretation.'OO 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the notion that interpre- 
tation is free and discretionary.lO' Interpretation is a dialogical 
100. Generally, advocates of the resolution of the objective-subjective opposition in 
jurisprudence have sought to construct a method of reasoning that integrates the objec- 
tive and subjective dimensions of human experience. For instance, see Roberto Unger's 
argument, supra note 99. In Unger's estimation, an "order of mind" must be constructed 
that exists "between" the particularity of events in human experience and the generality 
of concepts and symbols constituting the content of human thought. Id. at  107-11. Fur- 
ther, this "order of mind" must employ neither the subjective valuations associated with 
the particularity of events nor the logic and causality associated with the generality of 
thought, but rather a "symbolic interpretation" that merges these two. Id. Examples of 
this interpretation are found in the aesthetic experience of finding universal meaning 
and concrete particularity in a great work of art or the religious experience of finding 
Christ as an embodiment of both the universal, infinite God and the particular, finite 
man. Id. at  144; see also Gross, supra note 5. 
In contrast, Professor Noel Reynolds contended that the escape from Bodenheimer's 
"blind alley" should begin with a complete reformulation of the classical ideal of legal 
objectivity into a notion of objectivity that more fully "squares . . . with actual human 
experience." Reynolds, supra note 5, at  27. In his estimation, this could be achieved by 
seeing legal generalizations as publicly corrigible; see also Fiss, supra note 1. 
101. The term "hermeneutics" can be traced to the Greek noun, hermeneia, mean- 
ing interpretation. See R. PALMER. supra note 4, a t  12-32. The term hermeneia appears 
to be derived from the name of the Greek god Hermes. Essentially, Hermes' task was to 
translate, or bring into a form intellectually accessible to human understanding, the 
transcendent knowledge of the gods. Analysis of Hermes' divine function of mediation 
between the world of gods and the world of men reveals a three-fold dimensionality that 
hermeneia, or interpretation, had for the early Greeks. First, Hermes was to reveal and 
proclaim the will of the gods to men. Thus, interpretation connoted an announcing of 
what was previously unrevealed. Id. at  15-20. Second, Hermes was to elucidate what was 
revealed by relating it to the listeners' own projects and intentions. Thus, interpretation 
to the Greeks carried with it the implication of a context in which the receivers of the 
message found themselves. The problem of interpretation was making clear the message 
in terms of the receivers' anticipations of meaning. Id. at  20-26. Third, Hermes was to 
bring the unintelligible into intelligibility through the medium of the people's own lan- 
guage. He was a translator who sought to mediate man's own understanding with the 
gods' understanding. For the Greeks, interpretation meant a mediation of world views, a 
fusion of different understandings in which interpreter and object both operated. Id. at  
26-32. 
Hermeneutics did not begin to assume the form of a theory of interpretation until 
the Reformation. Arguing that the Bible could be understood independently and validly 
without the dogmatic interpretation of the Catholic Church, the Reformers sought a the- 
ory of biblical exegesis that would allow their interpretation to stand on its own. See J. 
BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  12-13; see also H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 153-55 
(1975). The Reformers argued that any textual passage, the sense of which is not clear, 
could be understood through the reciprocal relationship between the whole text and its 
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interaction between interpreter and text that occurs within an a 
priori relationship that is mediated by their common history 
and language. In this interaction, neither interpreter nor text de- 
termines textual meaning independently of the other; both in- 
terpreter and text contribute interdependently to the determi- 
nation of textual meaning. In essence, philosophical 
particular passages. While the whole scriptural text guided the interpretation of the par- 
ticular passages, the meaning of the whole could be reached only through the cumulative 
understanding of individual passages. From sacred texts, it was only a small step to ap- 
ply the same insight to profane texts. 
Until Friedrich Schleiermacher, "special" hermeneutics existed in the various disci- 
plines, depending upon the kind of text involved and the theoretical problems peculiar 
to the discipline. Schleiermacher sought to establish a "general" hermeneutic underlying 
all specialized hermeneutics by trying to elucidate the foundational act of all hermeneu- 
tics-the act of understanding itself. Arguing that understanding occurs primarily 
through a comparing of the unintelligible to the already intelligible, he schematized the 
act of understanding as a circle. Just as the unclear meaning of a particular textual pas- 
sage is made clear by reference to the general meaning of the whole text, so is any partic- 
ular experience made intelligible by reference to what has already been understood. But 
what has already been understood is only the accumulation of the meaning of particular 
experiences. This schema of understanding-the general informing the particular and 
the particular informing the general-became known as the "hermeneutical circle." See 
J .  BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  13-16; H. GADAMER, supra, a t  162-74; R. PALMER, supra note 
4, a t  75-97. 
Following Schleiermacher's attempt to generalize hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey 
sought to make hermeneutics the foundation for all the human sciences by providing a 
universally valid methodological basis for the interpretation of all human expressions. 
Dilthey believed that employment of the hermeneutical circle could lead to a knowledge 
of the human world resembling the natural sciences' knowledge of nature. Asserting that 
the meaning of all human action lay in the subjective intention of the actor, Dilthey 
reasoned that the task of understanding was to reconstruct the actor's original "life- 
experience" by way of the hermeneutical circle in order to understand the actor as he 
understood himself. See J .  BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  19-26; H. GADAMER, supra, a t  192- 
234; R PALMER. supra note 4, a t  98-123. In this respect, Dilthey presages Collingwood's 
objective reenactment theory of interpretation. See supra note 8. 
Dilthey's notion of understanding marked a decisive turn in hermeneutic theory-a 
turn that Hans-Georg Gadamer viewed as wrong. In Gadamer's view, Dilthey's herme- 
neutics impiied that the inquirer's present situation had a negative value. Understanding 
the actor as he understood himself required "essentially a self-transposition or imagina- 
tive projection whereby the [inquirer] negates the temporal distance that separates him 
from the object and becomes contemporaneous with it." Linge, Introduction to H. 
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, a t  xiv (1976). In other words, temporal distance 
between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry is a source of prejudice that hinders 
valid understanding and that must be transcended. To the extent that Dilthey's notion 
of understanding demands negation of the inquirer's present and extrication from his 
immediate historical situation, Gadamer believed Dilthey's hermeneutic theory must be 
rehabilitated. Gadamer argued that the interpreter can never extricate himself from the 
entanglements of his history and the prejudices that come with those entanglements. 
The interpreter's history is always constitutively involved in his process of understand- 
ing. Id. 
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hermeneutics sees interpretation as an activity of mutual con- 
straint between the interpreter and the text. 
A. The Historicality of Interpretation 
Philosophical hermeneutics' rejection of the free and discre- 
tionary view of interpretation begins with an argument for the 
fundamental historicality of interpretation. Philosophical her- 
meneutics contends that every interpreter is historically situ- 
ated. To be historically situated means to be inextricably located 
within a relational context that bears the stamp of the past.lo2 
An interpreter's historical situatedness implies both that the in- 
terpreter cannot encounter the present without a direction to his 
project and a perspective of his text that are dictated to him 
from his past and, equally important, that there are parameters 
to his project and boundaries to his perspective. In other words, 
the interpreter's past not only provides certain possibilities for 
seeing the present, it also limits what can possibly be seen. 
Both the possibilities and the limitations of the interpreter's 
present are a manifestation of the interpreter's "effective-his- 
tory."lo3 The effective-history of an interpreter "determines in 
advance both what seems to [him] worth enquiring about and 
what will appear [to him] as an object of inve~tigation."'~~ Put 
another way, it is the interpreter's "horizon," or "range of vi- 
sion[,] that includes everything that can be seen from a particu- 
102. See H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  225-74. Gadamer is deeply indebted to 
Martin Heidegger for this view of the interpreter. In his phenomenology of man, Heideg- 
ger contended that man's being is "Dasein" (There-Being). M. HEIDEGGER. BEING AND 
TIME (1962). In other words, man is always located temporally and spatially. However, 
man does not exist solipsistically; his being is "Being-in-the-world." Id. at  78-90. By 
"world," Heidegger means not just the natural environment of entities, but the relational 
context in which man always finds himself immersed and in terms of which each entity is 
pregrasped and preunderstood. Id. at  91-145. The existential structures of "Being-in-the- 
world" are man's primordial "being-with" objects of experience, his "being-in" situa- 
tions, and his "being-towards" (caring for) objects of experience. Id. at  149-273. Each of 
these structures presumes that man "grasps in advance" the objects of his experience 
because of his primordial relation to them. Id. at  188-95. Consequently, human under- 
standing has a prestructure which comes into play in all interpretation. For this reason, 
"[ilnterpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to 
us" in advance. Id. at  191-92. Gadamer seized upon these basic insights about man and 
interpretation. "Heidegger's temporal analytics of human existence (Dasein) has, I think, 
shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours 
of the subject, but the mode of being of [man] itself." H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at  
xviii; see also J. BLEICHER, supra note 4, at  98-103; R. PALMER, supra note 4, at  124-61. 
103. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at  267-74. 
104. Id. at  267-68. 
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lar vantage point."lo5 Moreover, the effective-history of an inter- 
preter infuses him with pre-judgments that he cannot possibly 
dispossess himself. Because he sees the present only in terms of 
judgments that he has drawn in the past, the interpreter's past 
judgments predispose him to judge the present in the same way. 
The interpreter always approaches the text with certain expecta- 
tions that reflect his past experience.lo6 
Not only is the interpreter historically situated, but so is his 
text. The effective-history of the text is manifest in the manner 
in which it has been previously understood. Its "horizon" is the 
range of its prior interpretations; its pre-judgment is how it has 
come to be judged by others.lo7 Importantly, it is the text's 
grounding in history that makes its present interpretation possi- 
ble. The interpreter's and the text's sharing of history allows the 
interpreter to have access to the text, to find relation with it, or 
to have a basis for understanding it at  all. In other words, a 
common history provides the medium for interpreting the text 
and determining its meaning. 
Given the historicality of both interpreter and text, philo- 
sophical hermeneutics maintains that interpretation and mean- 
ing are possible only because of the interpreter's historically 
based pre-judgments of the text. This claim is illustrated by re- 
105. Id. at 269. 
106. H. GADAMER. The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILO- 
SOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976). 
[Tlhe historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of 
the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. 
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions 
whereby we experience something-whereby what we encounter says some- 
thing to us. 
Id.  Certainly, one of the most controversial aspects of philosophical hermeneutics is the 
notion that pre-judgment has positive, rather than negative value for interpretation. 
Gadamer attributes the negative connotation of pre-judgment to the Enlightenment. H. 
GADAMER, supra note 101, at  239-45. The Enlightenment idealized reason as the autono- 
mous determiner of judgments. Pre-judgments were seen as being remnants of an unen- 
lightened mentality that impedes rational self-determination. Truth was obtained by re- 
jecting pre-judgments and establishing an impartial system of rules and methodological 
principles. Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate the concept of pre-judgment. Given man's his- 
toricality, pre-judgments are an ontological fact. 
107. In the case of an interpreter's original reading of a text, the horizon of the text 
is not so much evident in its historicality as it is in its linguisticality. In this case, the 
text is intellectually accessible to the interpreter primarily because of their sharing of a 
common language. As will be shown in section C, language has an horizon too; it is the 
peculiar world view of the community that possesses the language. See infra text accom- 
panying notes 134-41. For this reason, the interpreter will always have certain expecta- 
tions of meaning from the language in which he is immersed. 
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flecting on the common interpretation of any written text. When 
an interpreter encounters a written text, he performs an act of 
projection. He projects onto the text the meaning that he antici- 
pates the text as a whole may have for him; his "effective-his- 
tory" disposes him to pre-judge the possible meaning of the text. 
However, in projecting the "fore-meaning"lo8 of the text, the in- 
terpreter may encounter passages that call into question its suit- 
ability and adequacy as an account. Most likely, the interpreter 
will be "pulled up short by the text," signifying that the pro- 
jected meaning of the text "does not yield any meaning or [the 
text's] meaning is not compatible with what [the interpreter] 
had expected."109 Consequently, the interpreter is compelled to 
account for the unsettling passage in his understanding of the 
text and to revise his fore-meaning accordingly. The revised 
fore-meaning then becomes the newly projected meaning, and 
the process of projection from fore-meaning to particular textual 
passages and back to fore-meaning continues as before. "The 
working out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in 
terms of what emerges as [the interpreter] penetrates into the 
meaning, is understanding what is there.""O 
In this illustration, the interpreter's pre-judgments "consti- 
tute the initial directedness of [his] whole ability to experience 
[the text] at  all."ll1 His pre-judgments direct him to the text as 
an object worthy of inquiry; they are the ground for his initial 
interest in reading the text. Moreover, his pre-judgments direct 
him along a particular course of inquiry; they are the fore-mean- 
ings that he projects for the text as a whole and that are revised 
as they become challenged by the text itself. Although the inter- 
preter's pre-judgments constitute his initial direction, they do 
not necessarily constitute solely his understanding of the text. 
His pre-judgments may turn out to be legitimate, and thus pro- 
108. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  237. 
109. Id. For a brief discussion of what philosophical hermeneutics intends in the 
word "meaning," see supra note 122 and authorities cited therein. 
110. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  236. The constant movement from the inter- 
preter's pre-judgment of the text to a particular passage of the text and back to pre- 
judgment, with both informing each other, illustrates the basic epistemological model of 
philosophical hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical circle." See supra note 101. 
The "hermeneutical circle" should not be understood to be viciously inescapable. For a 
cogent clarification of this commonly misunderstood aspect of philosophical hermeneutic 
theory, see D. HOY, supra note 4, at  2-6. 
111. H. GADAMER, The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHIL- 
OSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976). 
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ductive for understanding, if they are confirmed in being 
"worked out" with the passages of the text. But his pre-judg- 
ments may also turn out to be illegitimate, and thus unproduc- 
tive for understanding, if they "come to nothing in the working 
out."l12 In either case, however, it is only in terms of the inter- 
preter's pre-judgments that judgments of the text can be 
reached. The crucial point is that pre-judgments become legiti- 
mate or illegitimate only if the interpreter allows them to be 
challenged and questioned by the object of his inquiry. Other- 
wise, the interpreter's pre-judgments become definitive and pre- 
scribe how he will understand the text. 
An interpreter prevents his pre-judgments from prescribing 
his understanding of the text by being "effective-history con- 
s c i o u ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Such c ~ n ~ c i o u ~ n e ~ ~  entails awareness of his pre-judg- 
ments and suspension of the effects of his effective-history. Ad- 
mittedly, suspension of effective-history is impossible in any 
absolute sense. "The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind 
of the interpreter are not at  his free disposal. He is not able to 
separate in advance the productive prejudices that make under- 
standing possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding 
and lead to  misunderstanding^.""^ But latent pre-judgments 
can be teased into the foreground of awareness through an open 
and direct confrontation with the text. In confronting the text, 
the interpreter encounters its "otherness" which throws his pre- 
judgments into contrasting relief and thereby casts them into 
the foreground of awareness for his critical scr~t iny."~ 
Although the text is historically related to the interpreter, it 
is nonetheless "an historically intended separate ~bject .""~ In 
other words, it is not only physically separate but also tempo- 
rally distant in its creation from the interpreter's present. Im- 
112. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  237. 
113. Id.  a t  268-71. 
114. Id .  a t  263. 
115. Linge, supra note 101, a t  xx-xxi. Linge illustrates this phenomenon in the his- 
tory of cultures: 
[I]t is in times of intense contact with other cultures (Greece with Persia or 
Latin Europe with Islam) that a people becomes most acutely aware of the 
limits and questionableness of its deepest assumptions. Collision with the 
other's horizons makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they 
would otherwise remain unnoticed. This awareness of our own historicity and 
finitude-our consciousness of effective history-brings with it an openness to 
new possibilities that is the precondition of genliine understanding. 
Id .  a t  xxi. 
116. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  263. 
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portantly, every interpreter, even the creator of the text, must 
accomplish his interpretation across some temporal distance 
that is never "a closed dimension, but is itself undergoing con- 
stant movement and extension."l17 This means that the inter- 
preter always occupies a new present in relation to the text, giv- 
ing him a new perspective (or pre-judgment) of the text that is 
shaped by concerns and expectations inherited from his con- 
stantly extending past. For this reason, a text is always endowed 
with a sense of "otherness," or   st ran genes^."^^^ To be sure, the 
text retains its sense of "familiarity"110 as well, because of its 
presence in the interpreter's history (and, as will be shown later, 
language); this familiarity is manifest in the interpreter's capac- 
ity to pre-judge the text. 
Thus, the interpreter's open and direct confrontation with 
the text reveals a "polarity of familiarity and st ran genes^."'^^ 
This polarity creates a contrast between what the interpreter 
presently expects to understand from the text and what the text 
historically has to say. 
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be 
able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas, 
missing as logically and stubbornly as possible the actual 
meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently au- 
dible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it. 
Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it 
to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained 
mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's quality of 
newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither 'neutral- 
ity' in the matter of the object not the extinction of one's self, 
but the conscious assimilation of one's own foremeanings and 
prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own 
bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and 
thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore- 
meanings.lZ1 
In other words, if the interpreter is open to the text, meaning 
that he is genuinely prepared to receive its message, then the 
text may expose his pre-judgments by way of establishing a con- 
trast between itself and those pre-judgments. In this way, the 
117. Id. at 266. 
118. Id. at 262. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 262-63. 
121. Id. at 238. 
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interpreter becomes aware of his pre-judgments and avoids the 
prescriptive effect they would have on his understanding of the 
text were they to remain latent in his consciousness. 
This open confrontation between the interpreter's pre-judg- 
ments and the text is the process by which the true meaning of 
the text emerges.122 In allowing constantly emerging pre-judg- 
ments to be contrasted and tested against the text, the inter- 
preter is in the position to discard pre-judgments that obscure 
textual understanding and to retain pre-judgments that are con- 
firmed by the text. In short, temporal distance between inter- 
preter and text does not obstruct understanding, but actually 
produces it. Temporal distance acts as a "filtering process;" it 
"not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and lim- 
ited nature die away, but causes those that bring about genuine 
understanding to emerge clearly as For this reason, in- 
terpretation and the determination of meaning are never a com- 
pleted task, but are "an infinite process."124 
In sum, the view of interpretation that emerges from a dis- 
122. In the parlance of philosophical hermeneutics, meaning is something that 
neither inheres in an object nor attaches to it as an arbitrary projection of thought. 
Meaning is contextual, occurring only in relationships with the interpreter. Meaning is 
seen as always being "for us;" it is found in making the unintelligible intelligible in terms 
of our present concerns and expectations, just as Hermes made the unintelligible world 
of the gods intelligible to man through the medium of man's own language. See R. 
PALMER, supra note 4, at  118-21, 184. 
This determination of meaning is thus dependent on the interpreter making the text 
"applicable" to him. Application is a crucial dimension of interpretation. See D. HOY, 
supra note 4, at  51-61. Gadamer believed that interpretation in theological and judicial 
contexts is particularly exemplary of this dimension: 
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential tension be- 
tween the text set down-of the Law or of the proclamation-on the one hand 
and, on the other, the sense arrived at  by its application in the particular mo- 
ment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. A law is not there 
to be understood historically, but to be made concretely valid through being 
interpreted. Similarly, a religious proclamation is not there to be understood as 
a merely historical document, but to be taken in a way in which it exercises its 
saving effect. This includes the fact that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is 
to be understood properly, i.e., according to the claim it makes, must be under- 
stood a t  every moment, in a particular situation, in a new and different way. 
Understanding here is always application. 
H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  275, 289-305. Both judicial and theological interpretation 
see the task as an effort to mediate the temporal distance between the historic text and 
the present situation. Thus, interpretation is not the objective reconstruction of another 
world in its own terms, nor the subjective determination of the world in terms of the 
interpreter's own vision and thoughts. 
123. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  265-66. 
124. Id. at  265. 
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cussion of its historicality is fundamentally different from objec- 
tive and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is a dynamic 
interaction, between the interpreter (his pre-judgments) and the 
text (its historical meaning), from which meaning is determined. 
The interpreter's pre-judgments contribute to the determination 
of meaning by providing the basis on which the text is made 
intelligible to the interpreter. But these pre-judgments do not 
prescribe meaning. So long as the text is allowed to have expres- 
sion and to challenge the interpreter's pre-judgments, the text 
contributes to the determination of meaning by compelling re- 
vised understandings of it. As a result, interpretation is neither 
free nor constrained, but is free and constrained. I t  is free in the 
sense that the interpreter approaches the text in accordance 
with his pre-judgments concerning it. But it is also constrained 
in the sense that these pre-judgments, shared by both inter- 
preter and text in their common historical medium, are subject 
to modification and revision in the interaction between the in- 
terpreter and the text. 
B. The Dialogical Structure of Interpretation 
As maintained in section A, interpretation requires open- 
ness to the text, meaning that the interpreter lays open the pos- 
sibility that the text may have something to say different from 
the interpreter's expectation of its meaning. But in so doing, the 
interpreter assumes the risk that the suitability of his pre-judg- 
ments for understanding the text may be called into question by 
the claims of the text itself. Indeed, the laying open of possibili- 
ties for other meanings of the text is the "essence of the ques- 
tion."l2Vor this reason, interpretation is said to have the struc- 
ture of q~es t i0n ing . l~~  The text asserts its claims, calling into 
question the interpreter's pre-judgments; the interpreter an- 
swers with revised judgments of the text that are drawn in terms 
of his prior understandings and the message of the text, but 
125. Id.  at 266. Gadamer indicates elsewhere that the openness that is "questioning" 
is not intermittent, but continuous and infinite. 
Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only because the person 
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which 
involves being able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The art of 
questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, [i.e.,] the art of 
thinking. It is called "dialectic", for it is the art of conducting a real 
coversation. 
Id .  at 330. 
126. Id.  at 266. 
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which may be called into question again by other textual 
passages. 
This question-answer-question structure suggests that the 
interpretive interaction between the interpreter and the text is 
dialogical. Indeed, dialogue is precisely the relationship the in- 
terpreter achieves with the text. The dialogues of Plato are para- 
digmatic of the character of the dialogue that occurs in interpre- 
tation.12? The purpose of the Platonic dialogues is for the 
interlocutors to reach a transcendent understanding about an is- 
sue of common concern. Importantly, the individuality of each 
interlocutor is not to be neutralized but is significant in achiev- 
ing of this understanding. For instance, the confrontation be- 
tween Socrates, the man of contemplation, and Callicles, the 
man of action, in the G o r g i a ~ l ~ ~  casts their peculiar pre-judg- 
ments into contrasting relief for their mutual scrutiny. The re- 
sult of their confrontation is thus more likely to be true under- 
standing because it is accomplished in terms of each others' pre- 
judgments and transcends each one's purely subjective 
perspective. 
The interlocutors of a Platonic dialogue move beyond their 
subjective perspectives when they inquire into the subject mat- 
ter of the dialogue. In other words, the more an interlocutor 
opens himself to the subject matter, the more his personal opin- 
ions cease to prescribe his understanding. An interlocutor be- 
comes engaged in an inquiry with the other interlocutors and 
falls out of an interrogation of them.12@ He gets "caught up" in 
127. Id. at  325-41. 
128. THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 299-307 (E. Hamilton and H. Cairns ed. 
1961). 
129. The distinction is crucial. Genuine dialogue is a focus on some subject matter, 
not on the particular interlocutors. To conduct a conversation "requires that one does 
not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the 
other's opinion." H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  330. The effort to "out-argue" is an 
undertaking that presumes the validity of one's own position and focuses on changing 
another person's views to conform with one's own. However, this kind of dialogue is in- 
consistent with the requirement of openness that leads to understanding because it is so 
uninterested in the other. Genuine dialogue is openness to another person's views, which 
changes the tenor of the undertaking into a common inquiry about some issue of com- 
mon concern. 
Just as there are legitimate and illegitimate pre-judgments, see supra text accompa- 
nying notes 111-12, so there are legitimate and illegitimate inquiries (or questionings). 
Legitimate (or "true") questioning is an inquiry with the answers still undetermined. 
Illegitimate (or "false") questioning is an inquiry with predetermined answers; it is con- 
cerned with hearing only what it has already decided is worthwhile to hear. This kind of 
questioning is illegitimate because it is so one-sided. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  326- 
27. 
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the conversation; he becomes engaged or possessed by the back- 
and-forth movement of the dialogue. At this point, the dialogue 
takes on a life of its own that is filled with unanticipated devel- 
opments that carry the interlocutor beyond his present perspec- 
tive.130 Although we frequently say that one may "conduct" a 
conversation, or dialogue, "the more fundamental a conversation 
is, the less its conduct lies within the will of [the parties]. . . . 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects illegitimate questioning in all its forms, including 
methods of prescribed inquiry. Methods are rejected as illegitimate because of their pre- 
scription of a correct answer to their inquiries: 
Strictly speaking, method is incapable of revealing new truth; it only renders 
explicit the kind of truth already implicit in the method. The discovery of the 
method itself was not arrived at  through method but dialectically, that is, 
through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being encountered. In 
method the inquiring subject leads and controls and manipulates; in dialectic 
the matter encountered poses the question to which he responds. 
R. PALMER, supra note 4, at  165. The philosophical roots for the rejection of methods are 
found in M. HEIDEGGER, Question, supra note 5, at  3; M. HEIDEGGER, Age, supra note 5, 
a t  115. 
130. "What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and 
hence so far transcends the subjective opinion of the partners to the dialogue that even 
the person leading the conversation is always ignorant." H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  
331. Later, Gadamer argues that the phenomenon of "hearing" illustrates the impossibil. 
ity of subjectivity in genuine dialogue. Id. at  419-21. 
Unlike seeing, where one can look away, one cannot "hear away" but must 
listen, unless the language is an alien one or is mere chatter. Even idle chatter 
has a way of captivating the listener against his will. Hearing implies already 
belonging together in such a manner that one is claimed by what is being said. 
D. HOY, supra note 4, at  66. 
The notion of being carried by the dialogue is illuminated by a second phenomenon 
used to support the hermeneutic view of interpretation-the phenomenon of a game (or 
"playing"). H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  91-114. The fundamental characteristic of 
the phenomenon of playing is the total absorption of the player in the back-and-forth 
movement of the game. In genuine playing, a player does not hold himself back in self- 
awareness, reflecting on the game as an object of definable procedures and rules. A 
player who cannot lose himself in earnest in the playing is a "spoilsport"-one who can- 
not play. Id. a t  91-92. Similarly, playing "cannot be taken as an action of subjectivity. . . 
.and self-possession. The real subject of playing is the game itself." Linge, supra note 101, 
a t  xxiii. The playing possesses the players; it has primacy over the players engaged in it. 
Moreover, 
[tlhe movement of playing has no goal in which it ceases but constantly renews 
itself. That is, what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not so much the 
particular goal it involves but the dynamic back-and-forth movement in which 
the players are caught up-the movement that itself specifies how the goal will 
be reached. 
Id. In other words, playing has its own momentum and carries its players along with it. 
The point is that interpretation involves the same kind of absorption of the interpreter 
in the question-answer-question movement between himself and the text. 
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[Tlhe people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the 
led. No one knows what will 'come out' in a con~ersation."'~~ 
This phenomenon of dialogue illustrates the nature of the 
relationship to be achieved between the interpreter and the text. 
Like dialogue, interpretation is an inquiry into a subject matter 
that concerns both the interpreter and the text. Like dialogue, 
interpretation also requires an openness to the particular view- 
point of another, meaning "acknowledgment that [the inter- 
preter] must accept some things that are against [him~elf]." '~~ 
Only in this way do both the interlocutor and the interpreter 
permit themselves to be engaged by the dialogical interaction 
and carried by it beyond their present perspectives. In short, 
both [dialogue and interpretation] are concerned with an ob- 
ject that is placed before them. Just as one person seeks to 
reach agreement with his partner concerning an object, so the 
interpreter understands the object of which the text 
speaks. . . . 
. . . [In] the successful conversation they both come under 
the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to 
one another in a new community . . . [it is] a transformation 
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were.'33 
Again, this dimension of the philosophical hermeneutic 
characterization of interpretation differs fundamentally from the 
presumption of objective and subjective interpretivism. Inter- 
pretation is not an essentially free and discretionary activity for 
which the existence of constraints is in dispute. Because inter- 
pretation does not occur independently of the dialogical relation 
between the interpreter and the text, it makes no sense to view 
the interpreter as essentially free to construe the text according 
to his subjective values. Interpretation is not a manipulative ac- 
tion of the interpreter's subjectivity, but is rather his placing of 
himself in dialogue with the text so that both the interpreter 
and the text move into a new understanding. 
C. The Linguisticality of Interpretation 
In sections A and B, interpretation has been shown to be a 
131. H GADAMER. supra note 101, at 345. 
132. Id at 324. 
133. Id.  at 341 (footnote omitted). The elevation of the interpreter's pre-judgments 
and the claims of the text into a higher generality, or "communion," is what philosophi- 
cal hermeneutics terms the "fusion of horizons." Id.  at 273. 
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transsubjective event. Both the interpreter and the text are ab- 
sorbed in a dialogical interaction from which new understand- 
ings arise. But the peculiar perspective of neither the interpreter 
nor the text is to be extinguished. The confrontation of these 
perspectives initiates the dialogical movement towards under- 
standing because of their contrast. In previous sections of this 
comment, the medium in which the dialogical interaction of in- 
terpretation occurs has been referred to simply as the common 
history of the interpreter and the text. However, this historical 
relation is not to be construed as something vague and intangi- 
ble; i t  has its concrete manifestation in language. For this rea- 
son, language is seen as being the "concretion of effective-histor- 
ical ~ o n s ~ i o ~ s n e ~ s . " ~ ~ ~  
The history of both the interpreter and the text makes itself 
known in the present by way of language. Language is the con- 
crete means by which the judgments and understandings of the 
past are carried into the present. Thus, the interpreter's effec- 
tive-history that provides his present pre-judgments exists in 
the language he employs. 
To say that the horizons of the present are not formed at all 
without the past is to say that our language bears the stamp of 
the past and is the life of the past in the present. Thus the 
prejudices [that philosophical hermeneutics] identifies as more 
constitutive of our being than our reflective judgments can now 
be seen as embedded and passed on in the language we use. 
Since our horizons are given to us prereflectively in our lan- 
guage, we always possess our world linguistically. Word and 
subject matter, language and reality, are inseparable, and the 
limits of our understanding coincide with the limits of our 
common language.lS5 
Thus, the mediation that occurs between an interpreter and the 
text, as in the dialogue between interlocutors, can be seen as 
"the full realisation of conversation, in which something is ex- 
pressed that is not only [the interpreter's] or [his text's], but 
The linguisticality of effective-history means that interpre- 
tation can occur neither prelinguistically nor extralinguistically. 
Not only does the text appear to the interpreter in terms of lan- 
134. Id. at 351. 
135. Linge, supra note 101, at xxviii. 
136. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at 350. 
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guage, but the interpreter can approach the text only in terms of 
language. There is no world outside language.I3' 
[Tlhe linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior, 
as contrasted with everything that is recognised and addressed 
as being. The fundamental relation of language and world does 
not, then, mean that world becomes the object of language. 
Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements is already 
enclosed within the world horizon of language. The linguistic 
nature of the human experience of the world does not include 
making the world into an 0 b j e ~ t . l ~ ~  
In other words, there is no world outside its presence as the sub- 
ject matter of some language community. One cannot experience 
language prior to experiencing the world, nor the world prior to 
experiencing language. "We cannot see a linguistic world from 
above in this way, for there is no point of view outside the expe- 
rience of the world in language from which it could itself become 
an 
Consequently, language is not simply an optional function 
that the interpreter engages in or does not engage in a t  will.I4O 
137. The idea of "world" has peculiar significance in philosophical hermeneutics. 
The idea has its origins in Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of man. See supra note 
102. World is not the environment, the sum total of all objects; i t  is rather the entire 
relational context in terms of which every object is pregrasped. Therefore, the world is 
never separate from man; it is prior to any separation from the objects of the world. M. 
HEIDEWER. supra note 102, a t  91-148. Philosophical hermeneutics carries forward 
Heidegger's notion of world by making explicit that  the human experience of world is 
linguistic. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  397-414. 
138. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  408. 
139. Id. a t  410. The peculiar world of a language community is known to any person 
who has mastered a foreign language. The language is a repository of cultural-historical 
experience. Consequently, many of its words and phrases have a richness of meaning 
that reflects that experience and, therefore, can be fully understood only by total immer- 
sion in the culture of the language community. Not surprisingly, translation of such 
words and phrases requires much more than mechanical synonym finding; it requires 
explanation of the foreign context of understanding. However, even with such an expla- 
nation there is always a sense of the loss of the dimensions of the language. See id. a t  
345-51. 
140. The fact that the world cannot be grasped prelinguistically or extralinguisti- 
cally is illustrated by our complete possession by language in even thinking about 
language: 
[All1 thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language. 
We can only think in a language . . . . 
Language is not one of the means by which consciousness is mediated with 
the world. . . . Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. For i t  is 
in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in 
hand and lay i t  aside when it has done its service. That  is not the same as 
when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their 
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Language is beyond the interpreter's manipulative control be- 
cause it is between him and the text, making possible his very 
relating to it. The interpreter cannot first have an extralinguistic 
contact with the text and then put the text into the instrumen- 
tation of language. "Language is not just one of man's posses- 
sions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a 
world at  all."141 Language is the very relational context in terms 
of which any text is pregrasped. Indeed, because language is pre- 
supposed in every act of interpretation of any text, it is prior to 
any separation of the interpreter and the text. Language is, 
therefore, prior to all objectivity and subjectivity since both are 
conceived within a schema that separates subject from object. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is a theory of interpretation 
that directly conflicts with the view of interpretation assumed in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The assumption is that interpre- 
tation is free and discretionary, meaning that no common stan- 
dards exist between the interpreter and the text to provide guid- 
ance for evaluating and judging the text. In a fundamental 
sense, the interpreter and text are assumed to be independent of 
each other. This assumption yields two approaches to adjudica- 
tion. The objective interpretivist approach constructs preestab- 
lished norms for inquiry that reflect the characteristics of the 
text itself so that the interpreter's judgment identifies with the 
text. The subjective interpretivist approach insists that judg- 
ments of the text will be drawn only in terms of the interpreter's 
preconceptions of the text. In other words, while the objectivist 
sees an independent text as determining understanding, the sub- 
jectivist sees an independent interpreter as determining 
understanding. 
The hermeneutic theory of interpretation, on the other 
hand, views interpretation as a dialogical interaction of inter- 
use let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose. 
Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over 
against the world and, as it wore [sic], grasp after a tool of understanding in a 
wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowl- 
edge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is 
our own. 
H. GADAMER, Man and Language (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 62 (1976). 
141. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  401. 
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preter and text that is mediated by their common history and 
language. As a result, neither interpreter nor text is sufficiently 
independent to be determinative of meaning. The text prevents 
the interpreter from being the sole determiner of meaning by 
providing a contrasting relief against which the interpreter's pre- 
judgments are brought to awareness for critical scrutiny. Like- 
wise, the interpreter prevents the text from being the sole deter- 
miner of meaning since the text is intelligible only in terms of 
the interpreter's pre-judgments. In these fundamental ways, the 
determination of meaning is beyond the control of either inter- 
preter or text; indeed, both contribute to the determination of 
meaning interdependently. 
In contrast to Anglo-American jurisprudence, philosophical 
hermeneutics concludes that interpretation is never an activity 
in need of constraints because it is a structure of existential con- 
straints. These existential constraints are the interrelations that 
exist between the interpreter and the text prior to  interpreta- 
tion. The interpreter's access to the text is made possible only 
because of the a priori mediation provided by their shared his- 
torical and linguistic context. This contextual interrelatedness 
provides both the possibilities and the limitations of the inter- 
~ r e t a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Moreover, the interpreter and text stand in a dia- 
logical relation without which interpretation cannot possibly oc- 
cur. The dialogical relation is prior to interpretation in the sense 
142. A similar idea has been expressed by Professor Stanley Fish in a critical re- 
sponse to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy for adjudication. Fish criticizes Dworkin for 
presuming the interpretive freedom of the first author in the chain. See supra note 41. 
[Tlhe first author has surrendered his freedom (although, as we shall see, sur- 
render is exactly the wrong word) as soon as he commits himself to writing a 
novel . . . . He must decide, for example, how to begin the novel, but the deci- 
sion is not "free" because the very notion "beginning a novel" exists only in 
the context of a set of practices that a t  once enable and limit the act of begin- 
ning. One cannot think of beginning a novel without thinking within, as op- 
posed to thinking "of," these established practices, and even if one "decides" 
to "ignore" them or "violate" them or "set them aside," the actions of ignoring 
and violating and setting aside will themselves have a shape that is constrained 
by the preexisting shape of those practices. This does not mean that the deci- 
sions of the first author are whollv determined. but that the choices available 
to him are "novel writing choices," choices that depend on a prior understand- 
ing of what it means to write a novel, even when he "chooses" to alter that 
understanding. In short he is neither free nor constrained (if those words are 
understood as referring to absolute states), but free and constrained. He is free 
to begin whatever kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by 
the finite (although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the no- 
tions "kind of novel" and "beginning a novel." 
Fish, supra note 5, a t  553. 
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
that interpretation cannot be undertaken without the open dia- 
logical interaction of interpreter and text. Importantly, these in- 
terrelations are said to be existential because they constitute the 
very manner of the interpreter's existence with the text.14= 
Again, the implication is that interpretation is so fundamental 
to the interpreter's means of knowing the text that the act of 
interpretation cannot be manipulatively controlled by the 
interpreter. 
The view of interpretation provided by philosophical her- 
meneutics represents a direct theoretical challenge to Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. Because Anglo-American jurisprudence 
presumes that interpretation is an essentially unrestrained activ- 
ity, the jurisprudential debate has focused on the availability of 
constraints for interpretation. Unfortunately, this debate has 
proceeded without a specific and systematic examination of the 
nature of interpretation upon which the entire debate rests. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is challenging because its examina- 
tion of the nature of interpretation concludes that interpretation 
is not what traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
blindly presupposed. Therefore, the ground upon which the ob- 
jective and subjective interpretivist debate stands is gone. 
This theoretical challenge deserves careful attention from 
the Anglo-American jurisprudential c~mmunity."~ Anglo-Ameri- 
143. The fundamental existentiality of these constraints in the act of interpretation 
prompted one commentator to conclude as follows: 
The task of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is ontological rather than 
methodological. It  seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions that un- 
derlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and non- 
scientific alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the 
interpreting subject does not ultimately preside. 
Linge, supra note 101, at  xi. Consequently, philosophical hermeneutics "pervades all 
human relations to the world." H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  xi. Its issue is "not what 
we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and 
doing." Id. a t  xvi. See generally M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 102. 
144. The purpose of this comment is to direct Anglo-American jurisprudential at- 
tention to its unexamined assumption about the nature of interpretation and to the phil- 
osophical hermeneutic challenge to this assumption. The presentation of a philosophical 
hermeneutic theory of law is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the present 
avoidance of an articulation of this theory does not mean that philosophical hermeneu- 
tics offers little or nothing that is directly relevant to the judicial context. Several ideas 
of jurisprudential relevance may be derived from the outline of philosophical hermeneu- 
tics provided herein. 
First, the idea of the historical mediation of the past with the present is relevant. A 
judicial interpreter can be easily characterized as situated in a historical present, facing 
the present expectations of litigants that are based on prior judgments drawn by legisla- 
tive writers or other judicial interpreters. The judicial interpreter's adjudicative task is 
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can jurisprudence can only stand to benefit by directing its at- 
tention to the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical 
hermeneutics. In the very least, attention to the hermeneutic 
theory of interpretation, even if it were ultimately rejected, 
could induce the critical and systematic jurisprudential study of 
the nature of interpretation that has heretofore been assumed 
but never studied. However, careful attention to the hermeneu- 
tic theory of interpretation will more than likely lead to an 
abandonment of the prevailing jurisprudential assumption about 
the nature of interpretation and a transcendence of the objective 
and subjective interpretivist debate that preoccupies Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. 
James J. Hamula 
to mediate these conflicting historically-based expectations, including his own pre-judg- 
ments that may come into play with the interests of the present case. See supra note 
122. 
Second, the idea that this mediation occurs in language is relevant to the judicial 
context. Law is language-bound because all the materials of the law have their existence 
in language. Any use of these materials in any context, including negotiation, litigation, 
and adjudication, occurs in language as well. In a very important sense then, the judicial 
interpreter is a necessarily obligated participant in language. The consequence of his 
participation is that his resolution of the litigants' claims is regulated by the same terms 
and conditions of language that regulated the linguistic articulation of those claims. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the idea of the dialogical structure of interpre- 
tation is ,relevant to the judicial context. In the adjudicative process, the judicial inter- 
preter is obligated to hear claims that he might not otherwise want to hear, to listen to 
all persons who will be directly affected by his resolution of their claims, and to respond 
specifically to these claims by resolving them and assuming responsibility for that resolu- 
tion. In other words, the adjudicative process institutionally compels the judicial inter- 
preter to confront openly and directly the interests and expectations of others. Philo- 
sophical hermeneutics indicates the significance of this confrontation for the judicial 
interpreter. The judicial interpreter's pre-judgments are brought to awareness (for him 
as well as for others) only when cast into contrasting relief against judgments that are 
different from his own. Once his pre-judgments are illuminated, they are more easily 
subject to critical evaluation (by him as well as -by others) for their suitability in the 
resolution of the dispute. In sum, the judicial interpreter is restrained by the very nature 
of his undertaking from interpreting in a free and discretionary manner. 
